Judicial Regulation of Union Elections by Summers, Clyde W.
THE YALE LA W JOURNAL 
VOLUME 70 JULY 1961 NUMBER 8 
JUDICIAL REGULATION OF UNION ELECTIONS 
CLYDE W. SUMMERSt 
UNION elections are the main nerve centers of union democracy, for it is 
through the officers that the will of the members is translated into effective 
action. The basic governing body of the international union is the conven- 
tion, itself a delegate body of elected representatives. It meets only briefly 
every two, three or four years; can at best decide only immediate issues or 
map broad policies; and must in turn place major governing responsibility 
in the international officers. Local unions must also rely heavily on repre- 
sentative government-"town meeting" democracy has limited usefulness. 
Many contain hundreds or even thousands of members, often scattered over 
a wide geographical area; meetings are infrequent and fragmentary; and the 
day by day decisions which fill out the body of union policy must be made 
by the officers.' 
Protection of union democracy requires, therefore, protection of the election 
process through which members select those who are to act on their behalf. 
The freedom to criticize union officers gains force when they are subject to 
being replaced; advocacy of new policies by union members is implemented 
by electing sympathetic officers; and the right to organize opposition groups 
bears fruit in the election contest. 
The Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959,2 which has 
as one of its central purposes the protection of union democracy, recognizes 
the key role of union elections. The Senate Report bluntly declared, "It needs 
no argument to demonstrate the importance of free and democratic union 
elections,"3 and Title IV created a new body of federal substantive law 
prescribing standards for the election process. 
tProfessor of Law, Yale University. 
1. Leaders may voice the aspirations, mold the formative opinions, express the 
inarticulate desires and press on in advance of the members for the realization of 
the ideals and concrete objects of workers. Officers are essential and their services 
highly desirable. They are, however, not more than responsive agents of the 
members, in and for the performance of such acts as by consent or express direction 
it is necessary for members to have done through representatives. 
Irwin v. Possehl, 143 Misc. 855, 863, 257 N.Y. Supp. 597, 606 (Sup. Ct. 1932). 
2. 73 Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. ?? 153, 158-60, 187, 401-531 (Supp. 1961). 
3. S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1959). 
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Although Title IV contains a large number of detailed rules, it does not 
purport to provide a complete code of specifics. Many of the statutory standards 
for particular parts of the election process are stated in general terms such 
as "a reasonable opportunity shall be given for the nomination of candidates,"4 
and that unions shall "comply with all reasonable requests of candidates" to 
distribute campaign literature The election process as a whole is governed 
by the catch-all clause that "adequate safeguards to insure a fair election 
shall be provided." Responsibility for giving content to these provisions 
rests largely on the courts. Prior to the election, union members may bring 
suits directly in the federal or state courts; these courts must then interpret 
the statute and. design appropriate remedies.7 After the election, challenges 
can be made only by filing a complaint with the Secretary of Labor. If he 
finds probable cause to believe that a violation has occurred, he must bring 
an action in the federal district court.8 Although this gives the Secretary some 
practical discretion, the ultimate responsibility for determining whether there 
has been a violation and whether a new election should be held rests on the 
court.9 
Judicial involvement in union elections is not new, for state courts have 
often been called upon to protect the process prior to the election or to set 
aside an unfair election after it was held. The experience thus gained can 
provide helpful guides in building the new body of federal substantive law, 
both by suggesting constructive solutions and warning of hidden pitfalls. 
Study of state court decisions may be directly relevant in two particular 
respects. First, the principal articulated standard applied by state courts has 
been that a union in conducting an election must comply with its own con- 
stitution and by-laws. This standard has been incorporated into the federal 
statute and made a part of federal substantive law.10 State court decisions 
show how these union provisions may be interpreted and applied. Second, 
state courts continue to have an active role under Title IV, for prior to the 
election, suits may be brought in the state courts to enforce the union's 
4. Section 401 (e), 73 Stat. 533 (1959), 29 U.S.C. ? 481 (e) (Supp. 1961). 
5. Section 401 (c), 73 Stat. 532 (1959), 29 U.S.C. ? 481 (c) (Supp. 1961). 
6. Ibid. 
7. The relative role of the state and federal courts in providing pre-election remedies 
has been discussed by the author in Pre-emption And The Labor Reform Act-Dual 
Rights and Remedies, 22 OHIO ST. L.J. 119 (1961). 
8. Section 402, 73 Stat. 534 (1959), 29 U.S.C. ? 482 (Supp. 1961). The last sentence 
of ? 403, 73 Stat. 534 (1959), 29 U.S.C. ? 483 (Supp. 1961), provides that this remedy is 
the exclusive method for challenging an election already conducted. 
9. Although the Secretary of Labor is responsible for supervising the election, it 
would seem that the court could prescribe certain procedures and safeguards required by 
the special circumstances to be observed in the conduct of the new election. 
10. The last sentence of ? 401(e), 73 Stat. 533 (1959), 29 U.S.C. ? 481(e) (Supp. 
1961), provides, "The election shall be conducted in accordance with the constitution and 
by-laws of such organization insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of 
this title." 
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constitution and probably other standards prescribed by the title." In ad- 
judicating those cases, state courts may tend to carry over old rules and 
attitudes and continue to apply familiar remedies. 
The purpose here is to explore the experience of state courts in supervising 
union elections by studying in depth the cases of one state, New York.12 
Not only were all published opinions organized, but court records were 
searched for unreported cases during a ten year period, and for each of the 
more than twenty-five cases during this same ten year period the entire 
court file including pleadings, affidavits and transcripts was analyzed. The 
litigation was traced to determine its eventual outcome, and many of the 
lawyers involved were interviewed to obtain additional information and their 
general evaluation of the problems involved.13 Such a study provides a fuller 
picture of the election process and gives perspective to the particular dispute 
before the court; it reveals the standards in fact applied by the judges and 
helps measure their adequacy in deciding that dispute; and it emphasizes 
the importance of the timing and the form of the remedy in giving effective 
protection. 
I. THE SCOPE AND NATURE OF THE PROBLEM 
To fulfill its democratic function, a union election requires much more 
than an honest count of the ballots. This is but the culminating act which 
crystalizes the result of the whole election process beginning before nomination 
and ending with tabulation. The role of the law is to protect that process, 
not merely to certify its results. In fact, honesty of the count is seldom 
questioned in court;14 rather the burden of litigation is to correct alleged 
violations in the preceding stages.15 
11. The jurisdiction of state courts to provide pre-election remedies was preserved 
by the second sentence of ? 403, 73 Stat. 534 (1959), 29 U.S.C. ? 483 (Supp. 1961), which 
provides, "Existing rights and remedies to enforce the constitution and by-laws of a labor 
organization with respect to elections prior to the conduct thereof shall not be affected 
by the provisions of this title." Beiso v. Robilotto, 47 L.R.R.M. 2590 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.). 
The power of the state courts to enforce other standards prescribed by the title has been 
discussed elsewhere. See note 7 supra. 
12. This was a part of a larger study of all of the internal union cases in the New 
York courts, and the analysis of the discipline cases has already been published in Sum- 
mers, The Law of Union Discipline: What the Courts Do In Fact, 70 YALE L.J. 175 
(1960). The analysis and conclusions presented there are directly relevant here for 
both discipline and election disputes are largely products of factional fights within unions. 
Indeed, a single political contest frequently leads to litigation of both kinds of disputes. 
13. The full study was initiated by the Governor's Committee on Improper Labor 
and Management Practices, and was continued as a part of a larger study conducted by 
the New York Department of Labor. The data collected in that study is used here with 
the generous permission of Industrial Commissioner M. P. Catherwood. The analysis 
and evaluation of the data, as well as the conclusions, are solely those of the author. 
14. For an exceptional case, see Carey v. International Bhd. of Paper Makers, 123 
Misc. 680, 206 N.Y. Supp. 73 (Sup. Ct. 1924). Honesty of the count has been involved in 
two referendum cases, Mayer v. Hansen, 260 App. Div. 150, 20 N.Y.S.2d 698 (1940); 
Rowan v. Possehl, 173 Misc. 898, 18 N.Y.S.2d 574 (Sup. Ct. 1940). 
15. The failure of the union to have an election is likewise seldom an issue except 
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The size and difficulty of the problem confronting the courts grows out 
of three inherent characteristics of the election process. First, the election 
process is a complex process made up of many critical details, and basic 
rights may depend on those details; second, it is a competitive process which 
may be manipulated to give one side an unfair advantage; and third, the 
process is politically controlled, largely by those already in power in the 
union. These characteristics must be examined before the impact of judicial 
intervention can be measured or adequate standards and remedies developed. 
Examination of the process is limited here largely to the problems revealed by 
the cases, and though incomplete, this provides a useful background against 
which the action of the courts may be studied. 
A. The Complexity And Detail of The Election Process 
The election process is actually a series of processes which may begin with 
the naming of an election committee and move by successive stages through 
nominating procedures, campaign activities, balloting, and finally end with 
a tabulation of the votes. Every stage is a complex of details bristling with 
points of potential dispute which may come before the courts.16 Disputes over 
details do not reflect mere contentiousness, for closer study of the cases 
makes manifest that basic democratic rights and the integrity of the election 
when a local union has been held in a long continued trusteeship. See, e.g., Dusing v. 
Nuzzo, 177 Misc. 35, 29 N.Y.S.2d 882 (Sup. Ct. 1941); Irwin v. Possehl, 143 Misc. 855, 
257 N.Y. Supp. 597 (Sup. Ct. 1932). 
16. Thus, at the nominating stage the court may be asked to decide whether there 
was adequate notice of the nomination meeting, Aliamo v. Rossiter, Sup. Ct. Erie City., 
May 23, 1941; whether a nomination requires a second, Buscarello v. Guglielmelli, 43 
L.R.R.M. 2753 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959); and whether candidates have been properly dis- 
qualified on the grounds that they lacked one year of continuous service, Clarke v. Corr, 
145 N.Y.S.2d 125 (Sup. Ct. 1955); Mixon v. Curran, Sup. Ct. N.Y. City., June 17, 1954; 
were not paid up in their dues, Harrison v. O'Neill, 26 L.R.R.M. 2294 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1950); or had not worked at the trade for a year, Kelman v. Kaplan, 91 N.Y.S.2d 165 
(Sup. Ct. 1949). The balloting is studded with even more problems, including the form 
of the ballot, Wilkens v. Sofield, 144 N.Y.S.2d 78 (Sup. Ct. 1955) (dispute whether vote 
is at meeting or by mail ballot); Rowan v. Possehl, 173 Misc. 898, 18 N.Y.S.2d 574 
(Sup. Ct. 1940) (dispute whether secret ballot required), the position of the candidates' 
names, Contes v. Ross, 125 N.Y.L.J., June 12, 1951, p. 2175, col. 5 (Sup. Ct.); Lawrenson 
v. Curran, 123 N.Y.L.J., May 1, 1950, p. 1532, col. 4 (Sup. Ct.), notice of the election, 
Fisher v. Kempter, 25 L.R.R.M. 2188 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1949); Paully v. Milling, Sup. Ct. 
N.Y. Cty., May 26, 1953, location of the polling places, Dusing v. Nuzzo, 263 App. Div. 
59, 31 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1941), hours for voting, ibid, proof of voter's membership, Cauley 
v. Quill, 139 N.Y.L.J., April 3, 1958, p. 6, col. 2 (Sup. Ct.), instructions on the ballot, 
Carey v. International Bhd. of Paper Makers, 123 Misc. 680, 206 N.Y. Supp. 73 (Sup. Ct. 
1924), use of voting machines, O'Connell v. O'Leary, 167 Misc. 324, 3 N.Y.S.2d 833 (Sup. 
Ct. 1938), and electioneering at the polls, Ford v. Curran, 36 L.R.R.M. 2407 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1955). 
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process depend on such details.17 In Gray v. Atkins,'8 the first round of the 
historic legal battle in Local 88 of the Master Mates & Pilots, members of 
the election committee sought to enjoin the local officers from encroaching 
on their authority to conduct the election. President Atkins, a candidate for 
reelection, had decided the format of the ballots, ordered them printed, and 
mailed them out. They were not consecutively numbered, and only Atkins 
knew how many were printed. In addition, the return address on the ballots 
mailed was the union office so that undeliverable ballots came into the in- 
cumbents' hands. The election committee was denied access to a membership 
list showing each member's financial standing, and to membership signature 
cards to check against returned ballots. In bringing the suit, the election 
committee was less concerned with asserting its authority than insisting on 
detailed safeguards to insure an honest election. 
Basic rights in the nominating process often depend upon isolated and 
seemingly remote details. Rejecting a nomination for lack of a second, after 
hasty closing of the nominations, may be but an excuse to eliminate unwanted 
opposition's Rival candidates may be declared disqualified for delinquency 
in dues even though their dues book shows them fully paid up,20 or employers 
may be induced to manipulate check-offs so as to disqualify potential oppon- 
ents to the administration. The impact of detailed rules -may be even more 
subtle. Requiring candidates to declare their candidacy four months prior 
to the nomination meeting may deter opposition where the union holds effec- 
tive control over job opportunities, for it compels potential insurgents to 
expose themselves to the hazards of punitive action. Requiring candidates for 
top office to have served previously on the executive board seriously handicaps 
an opposition group in replacing the incumbents unless it can inspire a "'palace 
revolt."22 These disputes do not concern mere technicalities but involve the 
right of the individual to run for office and, more importantly, the right of 
members to select leaders of their own choosing. 
17. The cases are used only to illustrate the variety and nature of potential problems. 
They are not used to show prevailing practice of any one union, or of unions generally. 
Indeed, even in the particular case, there may be no evidence to support the allegation. 
However, the bare allegation gives insight as to the potential trouble spots in the process 
and the problems which may confront the court. A few cases seem to be nothing more 
than a legal contest based on a technicality. See, for example, Zacharias v. Siegal, 7 Misc. 
2d 55, 165 N.Y.S.2d (Sup. Ct. 1956) (dispute over who should be seated when the winning 
candidate died the day before the election); Mixon v. Curran, Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty., June 
17, 1954 (claim by opponent that incumbent candidate had not worked at trade for required 
period); O'Connell v. O'Leary, 167 Misc. 324, 3 N.Y.S.2d 833 (Sup. Ct. 1938) (claim by 
loser that winner was not paid up in his dues because employer had not remitted check-off). 
18. 122 N.Y.S.2d 36 (Sup. Ct. 1953). 
19. Buscarello v. Guglielmelli, 43 L.R.R.M. 2753 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959). 
20. Harrison v. O'Neill, 26 L.R.R.M. 2294 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1950). 
21. Kelly v. Moran, Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty., June 10, 1958. 
22. Harrison v. O'Neill, 26 L.R.R.M. 2294 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1950). 
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Denial of the right to vote may take such flagrant forms as relegating a 
large segment of the members to a non-voting "Class B" status,23 or requiring 
voters to show their membership cards and refusing to supply many members 
with such cards.24 Disenfranchisement, however, may be much less direct. 
Notice of the time and place of the election may be inadequate or so confusing 
as to prevent many from attending.25 The election may be held at a time 
when some members are working, or the polls may not be open during 
convenient hours. Where a local covers a large geographical area, voting at 
the union headquarters may effectively discourage participation. Inadequate 
instructions may cause many members to spoil their ballot.28 Preserving 
secrecy of the ballot requires even more detailed safeguards, particularly in 
mail balloting where even the transparence of the envelope paper may be 
important.27 
B. The Competitive Character of Union Elections 
Uncontested elections do not produce litigation; the courts become involved 
only when there are competing factions. The help of the court is sought not 
only to protect basic rights but to enforce rules of fair competition. For 
example, in Contes v. Ross,28 an opposition group in Local 6 of the Hotel & 
Restaurant Employees petitioned the court to appoint an administrator to 
conduct the election. They claimed that the election committee had not been 
elected but appointed by the trustee; that two leaders on the opposition slate 
had been wrongfully disqualified for suing the union; and that the election 
committee undermined a third candidate, by declaring that putting him on 
the ballot did not determine his ability to hold office, as he might be disquali- 
fied under the provision which barred members of subversive groups. They 
further claimed that the election committee delayed passing on the qualifica- 
tions of opposition candidates and announcing the row on the ballot assigned 
to the opposition group, thereby giving the administration, whose candidates 
and place on the ballot were predetermined, extra time to campaign "Vote 
Row A." When the ballots were printed, an opposition candidate for vice- 
23. Kelly v. Moran, Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty., June 10, 1958. 
24. Cauley v. Quill, 139 N.Y.L.J., April 3, 1958, p. 6, col. 2 (Sup. Ct.). 
25. Fisher v. Kempter, 25 L.R.R.M. 2188 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1949). In Paully v. Milling, 
Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty., May 26, 1953, it was alleged that the time and place of the election, 
along with other rules governing elections were fixed in the union constitution but copies 
of the constitution were not available to the members. 
26. Carey v. International Bhd. of Paper Makers, 123 Misc. 680, 206 N.Y. Supp. 73 
(Sup. Ct. 1924). 
27. See Eimans v. Gallagher, 17 Misc. 2d 213, 185 N.Y.S.2d 77 (Sup. Ct. 1959). In 
another situation, complaints were made that the Honest Ballot Association in administer- 
ing a mail ballot had had the marked ballots returned to the union office and they could 
be read through the thin paper of two envelopes. This not only destroyed the secrecy of 
the ballot but gave the officers an opportunity to destroy unfavorable ballots. N.Y. Times, 
Sept. 16, 1959. 
28. 125 N.Y.L.J., June 12,1951, p. 2175, col. 5 (Sup. Ct.). 
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president who had a large following was not listed with the opposition slate 
but in a separate row as an independent. Throughout the campaign, the 
Local's paper supported the administration and bitterly attacked the opposing 
candidate. The core of the complaint was that the administration group, by 
controlling the election committee and the union newspaper, had gained an 
unfair advantage over the opposition group. 
Competitive advantage can be achieved by manipulating detailed elements 
of the election process. Stewards can be elected at large rather than by dis- 
tricts,29 or certain local unions may be consolidated to engulf pockets of 
opposition. Officers seeking reelection may use the union letterhead for 
campaign mailings, gaining not only a financial but psychological advantage 
because of the official appearance of their statements.30 The ballot may be 
arranged to favor one slate; the election may be adjourned to frustrate 
a large opposition turnout ;3 or the polling places may be more convenient 
for one faction than another. Even variations between the sample ballot and the 
actual ballot may produce charges of unfairness where one group's leaflets 
have heavily emphasized their ballot position, particularly among non-English 
speaking members.32 
The most important aspect of maintaining equality between the competing 
groups is providing equal access to the membership during the election cam- 
paign. The two critical instruments for access are the union newspaper and 
the union membership list. In Ford v. Curran 33 a defeated candidate in the 
National Maritime Union asked the court to set aside the election because 
President Curran had used his column in the union newspaper to recommend 
the administration slate and castigate the opposition. In other cases opposition 
groups have sought to neutralize the newspaper either by enjoining it from 
printing matter favorable or unfavorable to any candidate34 or by compelling 
it to give equal space to all candidates.35 Even this, however, cannot fully 
counterbalance the printing of news stories that may indirectly aid one side 
or the other.36 
29. See Caliendo v. McFarland, 13 Misc. 2d 183, 175 N.Y.S.2d 869 (Sup. Ct. 1958). 
30. Paully v. Milling, Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty., May 26, 1953. 
31. Daley v. Stickel, 6 App. Div. 2d 1, 174 N.Y.S.2d 504 (1958). 
32. See Lawrenson v. Curran, 123 N.Y.L.J., May 1, 1950, p. 1532, col. 4 (Sup. Ct.). 
33. 36 L.R.R.M. 2407, 2409 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1955). 
34. See Contes v. Ross, 125 N.Y.L.J., June 12, 1951, p. 2175, col. 5 (Sup. Ct.). 
35. Gray v. Atkins, 122 N.Y.S.2d 36 (Sup. Ct. 1953). 
36. In the later election in Local 88 of the Master Mates & Pilots the trustee of the 
local, who was also a candidate, had printed in the union newspaper a copy of the trustee- 
ship report required to be filed under the Labor Reform Act. This report inevitably justi- 
fied the trusteeship and criticized the insurgents for their conduct which brought about 
trusteeship. It also placed the best light on the trustee's own administration. The opposition 
complained that this violated the stipulation that the newspaper was to remain neutral, 
but the court appointed administrator took no action other than to admonish that the 
newspaper should contain only factual reporting and no editorializing. 
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Access to the membership list is even more critical, especially when the 
members are widely scattered. A Bartenders local may cover several coun- 
ties,37 an Operating Engineers local may contain 4,000 members working in 
small groups throughout the New York City area,38 and members of a mari- 
time union may be scattered to the four winds.39 Without a membership list, 
candidates cannot know who are members or where to contact them. This 
inevitably works in favor of the incumbents, for in administering the union 
they can establish contact, make themselves and their views known, and hold 
a virtual monopoly over the channels of communication.40 The opposition re- 
quires access to the union newspaper and membership lists to help offset 
the inherent advantages of the administration. 
C. Political Control of The Election Process 
The problem of maintaining equality in a contested election is aggravated 
by the fact that control of the process is commonly in the hands of one of the 
competing factions. The lack of any established two-party system in most 
unions hinders the development of devices for sharing of control between the 
opposing groups. The court may even be asked to confirm control in one 
of the competing groups. Thus in Gray v. Atkins,41 the center of the legal 
battle was whether the election committee or the incumbent officers should 
print and control the handling of the ballots and make rules governing access 
to the union newspaper and membership lists. 
Normally union officers control the election process. They call and preside 
at the nomination meeting, rule on the qualifications of candidates, design 
the ballot, fix the time and place of the election, and rule on the qualifications 
of voters. Many of these functions may be vested in an election committee, 
but, as Contes v. Ross illustrates, the administration group often dominates this 
committee.42 Although those in control are governed by the union constitution, 
37. Harrison v. O'Neill, 26 L.R.R.M. 2294 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1950). 
38. Kelly v. Moran, Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty., June 10, 1958. 
39. Gray v. Atkins, 122 N.Y.S2d 36 (Sup. Ct. 1953). 
40. For a thoughtful discussion of the advantages of the incumbent officers because 
of their control of the channels of communication, see LIPsET, TROW & COLEMAN, UNION 
DEMOCRACY (1956). This problem is much more acute in international unions than in 
local unions, see LEIsERSoN, AMERICAN TRADE UNION DEMOCRACY (1959). 
41. 122 N.Y.S.2d 36 (Sup. Ct. 1953). 
42. Although the original decision or the decision on appeal concerning a dispute in 
a local union election is made by the international officers, political considerations may 
control. In releasing a local union from trusteeship, the international officers commonly 
seek to install local officers who are sympathetic. In other cases, international officers 
may have political alliances with the local administration or see the opposition group in 
the local as a present or potential opposition group at the international level. In general, 
most international officers do not look with favor upon "factional" (that is, opposition) 
groups within the local unions, and this strengthens their self-restraint in not interfering 
with local autonomy. 
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its sketchy provisions leave substantial room to maneuver for critical ad- 
vantages. 
The use of outside agencies such as the Honest Ballot Association or 
the Election Institute to conduct union elections may reduce but will seldom 
solve the problem of political control. If they do no more than collect the 
ballots and count them, the most important parts of the election process are 
left in the hands of the incumbent officers. Seldom are such agencies given 
sufficient authority and responsibility over the entire process to prevent 
political manipulation of critical details. They put their imprint of integrity 
on an election whose integrity they cannot warrant and thereby lull the 
courts into the pleasant illusion that intervention is unnecessary. 
Protecting the election process, therefore, makes exacting demands on the 
courts. To determine the importance of any claimed defect, the court must 
be sensitive to the potential importance of details, examine closely the entire 
factual context of the dispute, and weigh the subtle impact the defect may 
have on the process. The task is made even more difficult by the need to define 
fair competition in such a way as to provide practical equality between the 
contending factions when the group in power not only enjoys inherent ad- 
vantages but controls the election process. 
The foregoing discussion has focused mainly on local union elections, for 
these produce the great bulk of litigation. Disputes in national elections seldom 
come before the courts,43 in large part because the great majority of those 
elections are uncontested and therefore generate no disputes." When con- 
tested, national elections pose many of the same problems as local elections, 
but in greater magnitude. The very size and structure of the union, along with 
wide dispersal of its members, increases the complexity of the process and 
gives the incumbents a greater advantage. National elections, however, pose 
additional problems. Whether election is by referendum or through delegates 
to the convention, balloting must be done through the local unions.45 Defects 
in the procedures at this level may disenfranchise the whole local or cast a 
cloud on the whole election.46 The court's problem of supervising or review- 
ing a national election is further complicated by the difficulty of obtaining 
43. For exceptions, see Carey v. International Bhd. of Paper Makers, 123 Misc. 680, 
206 N.Y. Supp. 73 (Sup. Ct. 1924); Lawrenson v. Curran, 123 N.Y.L.J., May 1, 1950, 
p. 1532, col. 4 (Sup. Ct.). Fitz v. Dullzell, 102 N.Y.S.2d 308 (Sup. Ct. 1950). 
44. See TAFT, THE STRUCTURE AND GOVERNMENT OF LABOR UNIONS ch. II (1954). 
45. Seamen's unions are exceptional, for election may be by referendum mail ballot 
cast directly and not through the local unions. The problems are much the same as a 
mail ballot by a large, widely dispersed local union. 
46. For example, in Carey v. International Bhd. of Paper Makers, 123 Misc. 680, 
206 N.Y. Supp. 73 (Sup. Ct. 1924) a number of locals followed their past practice of 
holding several meetings at various places in their jurisdiction for the purpose of balloting. 
This was found to conflict with the constitution which required a single meeting, the votes 
were voided, and Carey lost his majority. 
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jurisdiction and exercising effective control over members located in other 
states.47 
II. STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL INTERVENTION 
Traditional doctrine declares that courts will not intervene in the internal 
affairs of voluntary associations except to protect property rights. This doc- 
trine, however, has not hindered the New York courts from intervening in 
union elections. The accordion term "property" has proven sufficiently ex- 
pansive to include both the interest of the candidate in holding the office,48 
and the interest of the members that the elected officers serve their terms. 
To the argument that union members had no property right in the election 
of officers, the court in Dusing v. Nuzzo 49 responded: 
The right to membership in a union is empty if the corresponding 
right to an election guaranteed with equal solemnity in the funda- 
mental law of the union is denied. If a member has a "'property right" 
in his position on the roster, I think he has an equally enforcible right 
in the election of men who will represent him in dealing with his 
economic security and collective bargaining where that right exists 
by virtue of express contract in the language of a union constitution. 
Where an election is required by the law of a union, the member 
denied the right to participate is denied a substantial right which is 
neither nebulous nor ephemeral. 
The court then issued a detailed order compelling the union to hold a long 
overdue election. 
The New York courts have manifested a willingness not only to require 
an election to be held,50 but have at various times intervened at every stage 
in the election process. Thus, the courts have enjoined the holding of an 
election because the election district was improperly drawn,5' there was 
not adequate notice of the nomination meeting, and members were intimidated 
from making nominations.52 The names of candidates improperly stricken from 
the ballot have been ordered restored,53 equal access to the union newspaper 
47. See id. at 689, 206 N.Y. Supp. at 85, in which the court noted the presence of 
"grave jurisdictional questions" but refused to decide them because it had already reviewed 
the merits and found no reason to upset the election. However, in other cases involving an 
international election, the courts have not found any jurisdictional obstacle, whether the 
suit is pre-election, Lawrenson v. Curran, 123 N.Y.L.J., May 1, 1950, p. 1532, col. 4 (Sup. 
Ct.); or post-election, Fort v. Curran, 36 L.R.R.M. 2407 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1955). However, 
all of the cases have involved unions in which the union's headquarters were within the 
state and the conduct complained of originated in the state. 
48. Carey v. International Bhd. of Paper Makers, 123 Misc. 680, 206 N.Y. Supp. 73 
(Sup. Ct. 1924). 
49. 177 Misc. 35, 37, 29 N.Y.S.2d 882, 884 (Sup. Ct. 1941). 
50. In addition to Dusing v. Nuzzo, supra note 49, see Irwin v. Possehl, 143 Misc. 
855, 257 N.Y. Supp. 597 (Sup. Ct. 1932). 
51 Caliendo v. McFarland, 13 Misc. 2d 183, 175 N.Y.S.2d 869 (Sup. Ct. 1958). 
52. Alaimo v. Rossiter, Sup. Ct. Erie Cty., May 23, 1941. 
53. DiBucci v. Uhrich, 21 Misc. 2d 1069, 189 N.Y.S.2d 717 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Mainculf 
v. Robinson, 19 Misc. 2d 230, 189 N.Y.S.2d 712 (Sup. Ct. 1958). In McCrave v. Severino, 
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and membership list required,54 and holding the election without proper 
notice prohibited.55 The courts have reviewed the qualifications of candidates 
elected,6 scrutinized the rulings on challenged ballots,57 and even determined 
the existence of locals from which delegates purposed to come.58 If the 
court finds the election valid it will enjoin the holding of- a new one to upset 
it.59 In these cases, the courts affirmatively intervened to regulate the election 
process, but even when relief has been denied it has not been for lack of a 
justicable interest, but because the court found that the plaintiff's case lacked 
merit 60 or that he had failed to exhaust his internal remedies.6' 
The demonstrated willingness of the New York courts to intervene in union 
election disputes only opens the door to the difficult question-What stand- 
ards do the courts apply in determining the merits of the particular case? 
This requires looking beyond the theories articulated by the courts to attempt 
to discern the inarticulate standards in fact applied. 
A. The Union Constitution As A Standard 
In union elections, as in other internal union cases, the articulated judi- 
cial theory is that the union constitution and by-laws comprise a contract 
between the union and its members.62 Each member, whether a candidate 
249 App. Div. 112, 291 N.Y. Supp. 303 (1936), the court enjoined the holding of an 
election because the name of one candidate who had been expelled from the union had not 
been stricken from the ballot. 
54. Contes v. Ross, 125 N.Y.L.J., June 12, 1951, p. 2175, col. 5 (Sup. Ct.) ; Pizer v. Trade 
Union Service, Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty., Jan. 9, 1950 (temporary restraining order barring both 
sides from using); Feb. 20, 1950 (temporary injunction ordering list be supplied to 
plaintiff); 276 App. Div. 1071, 96 N.Y.S.2d 377 (1950) (temporary injunction requiring 
delivery of list reversed until after trial). 
55. Fisher v. Kempter, 25 L.R.R.M. 2189 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1949). Similary, the holding 
of an election at an improper time will be enjoined, Maddock v. Reul, 143 Misc. 914, 256 
N.Y. Supp. 915 (Sup. Ct. 1932). 
56. Litwin v. Novak, 9 App. Div. 2d 789, 193 N.Y.S.2d 310 (1959); O'Connell v. 
O'Leary, 167 Misc. 324, 3 N.Y.S.2d 833 (Sup. Ct. 1938). 
57. Carey v. International Bhd. of Paper Makers, 123 Misc. 680, 206 N.Y. Supp. 73 
(Sup. Ct. 1924); Bowman v. Horn, 127 N.Y.L.J., Jan. 28, 1952, p. 372, col. 5 (Sup. Ct.). 
58. Lacey v. O'Rourke, 147 F. Supp. 922 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). 
59. Litwin v. Novak, 9 App. Div. 2d 789, 193 N.Y.S.2d 310 (1959); Daley v. Stickel, 
2 App. Div. 2d 287, 153 N.Y.S.2d 886 (1956). 
60. See, for example, Harrison v. O'Neill, 26 L.R.R.M. 2294 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1950) 
(ex parte restraining order dismissed); Kennedy v. Doyle, 140 N.Y.S.2d 899 (Sup. Ct. 
1955); Clarke v. Corr, 145 N.Y.S.2d 125 (Sup. Ct. 1955); Zacharias v. Siegal, 7 Misc. 
2d 58, 165 N.Y.S.2d 925 (Sup. Ct. 1957); Cauley v. Quill, 139 N.Y.L.J., April 3, 1958, 
p. 6, col. 2 (Sup. Ct.). 
61. See, for example, Gleicher v. Piazzo, 4 L.R.R.M. 850 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1939); 
Redler v. Sanginari, 5 L.R.R.M. 954 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1940); Paully v. Milling, Sup. Ct. 
N.Y. Cty., May 27, 1953; Kelman v. Kaplan, 91 N.Y.S.2d 165 (Sup. Ct. 1949). 
62. See, e.g., Carey v. International Bhd. of Paper Makers, 123 Misc. 680, 688, 206 
N.Y.S. 73, 84 (Sup. Ct. 1924); Dusing v. Nuzzo, 177 Misc. 35, 37, 29 N.Y.S.2d 882, 884 
(Sup. Ct. 1941). 
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or a potential voter, has a legally enforcible right that elections be conducted 
in compliance with the constitution and by-laws.63 The practical significance 
of the contract theory is that it establishes the union's own constitution as 
the ostensible standard for judicial settlement of internal union disputes. 
This standard has proven neither so precise nor so complete as the 
language in the cases pretend, but it does provide the initial guide-line 
for the courts. Where constitutional provisions are explicit, the courts re- 
quire strict compliance. Thus, courts have refused to recognize custom or 
past practice as justifying any deviation from the prescribed procedures," 
even though these were followed in good faith and provided greater op- 
portunity for the members to participate. Although the courts sometimes say 
that only "substantial compliance" is required,66 the cases indicate that they 
actually enforce the constitutional provisions with single-minded rigidity. 
Some looseness and flexibility in this standard is inevitable, for even ex- 
plicit provisions often prove unclear in concrete cases. The words of the 
constitution must be interpreted, and this is for the courts.67 For example, 
in Litwin v. Novak,68 the constitution elliptically required a candidate "to 
be employed at his calling. . . for a period of one year." The General Execu- 
tive Board interpreted this as not applying to those attached to the trade but 
unemployed due to illness or physical incapacity. When a local union ignored 
this ruling and disqualified a member who had been unable to work because 
of an injury suffered on the job, the General Executive Board ordered a 
new election. The court, at the behest of the winning candidate, enjoined the 
holding of another election. Although the court declared that the constitution 
was "unambiguous," and could not be amended "under the guise of inter- 
63. See, e.g., Caliendo v. McFarland, 13 Misc. 2d 183, 188, 175 N.Y.S.2d 869, 875 (Sup. 
Ct. 1958); Fisher v. Kempter, 25 L.R.R.M. 2188 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1949); Fisher v. Kempter, 
25 L.R.R.M. 2189 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1949). 
64. Fritsch v. Rarback, 199 Misc. 356, 98 N.Y.S.2d 748 (Sup. Ct. 1950) (dictum); 
Waldman v. Ladisky, 122 N.Y.L.J., Dec. 8, 1949, p. 1562, col. 5 (Sup. Ct.). In both cases a 
referendum had been voted in some locals by a show of hands as had been the long established 
custom instead of by secret ballot as provided in the constitution. The court, in invalidat- 
ing the referendum, declared, "even a universal and long continued practice of voting by 
open count of hands would show, not a construction of the constitution, but merely a 
widespread violation or disregard of it." 
65. In Carey v. International Bhd. of Paper Makers, 123 Misc. 680, 206 N.Y. Supp. 
73 (Sup. Ct. 1924), some of the locals, instead of holding a single meeting for voting as 
indicated in the constitution, followed past practice of holding meetings in various places 
to make it easier for all members to vote. For this violation of the constitution, all of the 
votes of the local were nullified. 
66. Kennedy v. Doyle, 140 N.Y.S.2d 899 (Sup. Ct. 1955). The court, however, 
found that the procedure did fit the literal terms of the constitution. 
67. Harrison v. O'Neill, 26 L.R.R.M. 2294 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1950) (by implication); 
Clarke v. Carr, 145 N.Y.S.2d 125 (Sup. Ct. 1955); Waldman v. Ladisky, 101 N.Y.S.2d 
87 (Sup. Ct. 1950). 
68. 9 App. Div. 2d 789, 193 N.Y.S.2d 310 (1959). 
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pretation,"89 in rejecting the Board's interpretation it was in effect substitut- 
ing one of its own. Some opinions declare that the courts will follow the 
interpretations of the union election committee or other appropriate officers.Y 
Close study of the cases, however, suggests that the courts in fact make an 
independent determination, and if this coincides with the union's decision, 
they then use the language of deference to reinforce their conclusion. 
Interpretation is not always a colorless process, but may provide the court 
an opportunity to shade meaning with judicially conceived values. The elec- 
tion cases do not bear such clear marks of this as the discipline cases, but 
traces are not lacking. In Fisher v. Kempter,7 for example, suit was brought 
to enjoin the installation of officers accused and later found guilty of mis- 
appropriating union funds. The court voided the election on the ground 
that the notice provision of the international constitution had not been fol- 
lowed. The local constitution contained no such provision, but the court 
held that the international constitution governed. In Wilkens v. Sofield,12 
suit was brought to enjoin giving effect to a referendum on by-laws which 
would have vested dictatorial powers in the local president. The international 
constitution provided that local by-laws could be amended by vote at a meet- 
ing or by a referendum, but the local constitution contained no provision 
for referendum. The court held that the local constitution controlled and granted 
the injunction. Although the two cases are not logically irreconcilable, the 
records in the cases suggest that the decisions were influenced by other than 
neutral principles of interpretation. 
In addition the courts have reshaped the constitution as a standard by 
finding that particular provisions were contrary to public policy and void.73 
This power has not been used in election cases, primarily because election 
provisions on their face affirm rather than deny democratic control, and are 
ostensibly designed to protect rather than defeat honesty and fairness in the 
election process. When particular action is taken which flagrantly violates 
69. 193 N.Y.S.2d at 312. For a similar case in which the court closely analyzed the 
words of the constitution defining the qualifications of candidates, see Harrison v. O'Neill, 
26 L.R.R.M. 2294 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1950). 
70. See Zacharias v. Siegal, 7 Misc. 2d 58, 165 N.Y.S.2d 925 (Sup. Ct. 1957); 
O'Connell v. O'Leary, 167 Misc. 324, 326, 3 N.Y.S.2d 833, 835 (Sup. Ct. 1938); Carey 
v. International Bhd. of Paper Makers, 123 Misc. 680, 687, 206 N.Y. Supp. 73, 83 (Sup. 
Ct. 1924). 
71. 25 L.R.R.M. 2188 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1949). 
72. 144 N.Y.S.2d 78 (Sup. Ct. 1955). 
73. "If and when such union legislation, or acts of government or administration, or 
any purported construction or decision, transcends reason or morals, or violates public 
law or rights guaranteed thereunder to the individual members, the courts, their juris- 
diction being properly invoked, with equal vigor will hear the cause and safeguard, limit, 
and restrain the illegal act within the bounds prescribed for lawful conduct." Irwin v. 
Possehl, 143 Misc. 855, 858, 257 N.Y. Supp. 597, 601 (Sup. Ct. 1932). See also Carey v. 
International Bhd. of Paper Makers, 123 Misc. 680, 687, 206 N.Y. Supp. 73, 83 (Sup. Ct. 
1924). 
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these principles, the courts can reach it by interpreting the constitution to pre- 
clude such action. Thus, in Irwin v. Possehl,74 the president of the Operating 
Engineers had placed a local union under the supervision of a hand-picked 
trustee who appointed all officers, business agents, and delegates, suspended 
the holding of regular meetings and elections, summarily suspended all critics 
and dissipated the union treasury. The constitution gave the president "super- 
vision over all local unions" with broad power to suspend members or 
officers. Convention resolutions had approved the use of this power to remove 
an "inferior leader" and replace him with one "better qualified" who should 
be "placed in charge and kept there while satisfactory." Undismayed, the 
court proceeded to interpret the constitution by first declaring: 
The constitution and laws of every labor organization are to be 
judged and construed in this state and country according to well 
conceived ideals and principles of law ordained by a democratic 
people proud of their heritage and jealous of the protection of their 
rights of equal opportunity, of voice in the selection of local and 
general officials, in taxation, the appropriation and expenditure of 
money for governmental purpose, and of the right and opportunity of 
assembly and freedom of speech.75 
The court then found in the web of provisions governing local unions a pre- 
dominant purpose that "the affairs of local unions are to be transacted by 
officers elected by the membership of the local unions."76 The powers given 
to the president must be "harmonized"- with this purpose, and therefore no 
trusteeship could continue beyond the time fixed in the constitution for a new 
election of officers. So interpreted, the constitution required termination of the 
trusteeship and the holding of a new election. Thus, the court by interpretation 
rewrote the provisions which violated the judicially declared policy of demo- 
cratic union control. 
The principal inadequacy of the union constitution as a standard is not its 
ambiguity or its oppressive provisions, but its incompleteness. Integrity of 
the election process depends on details, but the election provisions in union 
constitutions are a random assortment of generalities and specifics, commonly 
leaving many critical details unmentioned.77 In many of the election cases the 
courts are compelled to adjudicate disputes with no clearly applicable pro- 
visions to guide them. For example, few constitutions contain provisions 
governing the use of the union newspaper or access to membership lists.78 
74. 143 Misc. 855, 257 N.Y. Supp. 597 (Sup. Ct. 1932). 
75. Id. at 858,257 N.Y. Supp. at 601. 
76. Id. at 865,257 N.Y. Supp. at 608. 
77. For a discussion of the variety of election procedures and the general lack of 
complete constitutional provisions, see BROMWICH, UNION CONSTITUTIONS 21-25 (Report 
to Fund for The Republic (1959). See also Cohany, Union Constitution Provisions: 
Election and Terms of National and International Union Officers, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR 
STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR 1958; Note, 34 NOTRE DAME LAW. 384, 425 (1959). 
78. See, e.g., Kelly v. Moran, Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty., June 10, 1958; Contes v. Ross, 125 
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The constitution may fail to indicate whether the ballot is to be secret,7 or 
what specific measures should be taken to safeguard its secrecy.80 It may lack 
complete provisions regulating the form of the ballot 81 and may be silent on 
how members may prove their qualifications to vote.82 Although an election 
committee is created to conduct the election, the constitution may fail to define 
the committee's authority to fill in these details or whether its rules are to have 
binding effect.83 The courts must decide these disputes and, in so doing, add 
to the union's constitution their own regulations of the election process. 
Gaps in the constitutional standard might be filled by enforcing the rules and 
decisions of the union's constituted authorities. This would limit the court 
to the relatively narrow but not always easy question of determining in 
whom the authority has been vested.84 The courts, however, have refused 
to play such a passive role. The cases indicate that judges are aware that 
this would simply put the imprint of legality on determinations made by the 
incumbent officers who have a personal interest in outcome of the election. 
Therefore, in filling gaps in the constitution, as in interpreting express 
provisions, the courts have insisted on making independent determinations.85 
The union constitution provides one guide-line for judicial intervention 
in election disputes, but standing alone it is inadequate. To resolve its 
ambiguities and to fill its gaps additional standards are required. The critical 
question is, what other standards do the courts use, and to what extent are 
they responsive to the needs of the election process? Discovering the other 
standards in fact applied is extremely difficult, for they are seldom articul- 
ately expressed or consistently enforced. Some added understanding of the 
factors which move the court can be gained by going behind the published 
opinions to the full record before the court, and by interviewing the lawyers 
who participated. From such a study of the cases there seems to emerge a 
N.Y.L.J., June 12, 1951, p. 2175, col. 5 (Sup. Ct.), Pizer v. Trade Union Service, 276 
App. Div. 1071, 96 N.Y.S.2d 377 (1950) (membership lists). In only one case, was there 
a guiding provision. Ford v. Curran, 36 L.R.R.M. 2407 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1955). 
79. See, e.g., Rowan v. Possehl, 173 Misc. 898, 18 N.Y.S.2d 574 (Sup. Ct. 1940). 
80. See, e.g., Eimans v. Gallagher, 17 Misc. 2d 213, 185 N.Y.S.2d 77 (Sup. Ct. 1959). 
It may even fail to state whether election shall be by plurality or majority or how such a 
question shall be resolved. See Collins v. Hamer, 46 L.R.R.M. 2633 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1960). 
81. See, e.g., Lawrenson v. Curran, 123 N.Y.L.J., May 1, 1950, p. 1532, col. 4 (Sup. 
Ct.). 
82. See e.g., Cauley v. Quill, 139 N.Y.L.J., April 3, 1958, p. 6, col. 2 (Sup. Ct.). 
83. See, e.g., Gray v. Atkins, 122 N.Y.S.2d 36 (Sup. Ct. 1953); Rowan v. Possehl, 
173 Misc. 898, 18 N.Y.S.2d 574 (Sup. Ct. 1940); Carey v. International Bhd. of Paper 
Makers, 123 Misc. 680, 206 N.Y. Supp. 73 (Sup. Ct. 1924). 
84. This was the central issue in Gray v. Atkins, supra note 83. Because the incumbent 
officers often control the election committee, the location of the authority at the local level 
seldom arises. Appeals from interpretations by either the election committee or the local 
officers are to the international officers, and then to the convention. 
85. Caliendo v. McFarland, 13 Misc. 2d 183, 175 N.Y.S.2d 869 (Sup. Ct. 1958); 
Frohlich v. Schimel, 107 N.Y.S.2d 502 (Sup. Ct. 1951). 
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number of standards, though not entirely consistent, which influence the 
outcome of the cases. 
B. The Standard of Democratic Rights. 
Through the cases runs the recurring theme that union elections should 
be conducted according to democratic principles-that unions are to be 
"judged ... according to well conceived ideals and principles of law ordained 
by a democratic people proud of their heritage."86 This standard is rooted 
largely in an analogy between unions and government, and requires that 
union members have the same basic right in selecting their leaders as citizens 
have in selecting public officials. The standard also expresses the union's 
own central principle of government, for union constitutions, and particu- 
larly election provisions, are built upon the democratic model.87 Thus in 
Irwin v. Possehl,88 the court used the union's provisions for democratic proce- 
dures in local unions to find in the constitution a dominant principle which over- 
rode grants of dictatorial power. The court thereby enforced not only its social 
policy but the union's democratic ethic. This standard, however, has been 
more boldly declared in general terms than applied in concrete cases. 
The most elementary right, the right to have an election, has been ex- 
plicitly recognized and protected by the New York courts 89 in cases in 
which local unions were held in bondage with long-continued trusteeships 
under corrupt and dictatorial officers. Judicial ordering of an election was 
86. Irwin v. Possehl, 143 Misc. 855, 858, 257 N.Y. Supp. 597, 601 (Sup. Ct. 1932). 
87. This central principle has been forcefully stated in the AFL-CIO Ethical Practices 
Code on Union Democratic Processes, which states: 
We are proud of our record. Just as the Constitution of the AFL-CIO proclaims 
its dedication to the concepts of freedom and democracy and contains machinery for 
their implementation in the Federation's operations, so also do the constitutions of 
its affiliates. Almost without exception, they provide for the basic elements of union 
democracy: the right of full and equal participation by each member in the affairs 
and processes of union self-government, in accordance with the principles of represent- 
ative democracy, and the needs for protecting the rights of individual members. 
In setting forth the code requirements, it is declared: 
1. Each member of a union should have the right to full and free participation in union 
self-government. This should include the right (a) to vote periodically for his local 
and national officers, either directly by referendum vote or through delegate bodies, 
(b) to honest elections, (c) to stand for and to hold office, subject only to fair 
qualification uniformly imposed, (d) to voice his views as to the method in which 
the union's affairs should be conducted. 
88. 143 Misc. 855, 257 N.Y. Supp. 597 (Sup. Ct. 1932). 
89. Dusing v. Nuzzo, 263 App. Div. 59, 31 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1941); Irwin v. Possehl, 
supra note 88. In Fittipaldi v. Legassie, N.Y. Sup. Ct. Onondaga Cty., March 26, 1958, the 
plaintiff's request to terminate the trusteeship and order an election was denied without 
prejudice to a new application if no election was held within four months. An election was 
held three months later and the insurgents won. Note, Union Democracy-A Case Study, 
10 SYRACUSE L. REv. 311 (1959). 
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reinforced in these cases by provisions in the union constitution requiring 
periodic elections, which were long since overdue. The value placed on this 
right and the resoluteness of the New York courts to protect it have never 
been tested by a case in which the constitution clearly permitted continued 
postponements of a convention or provided life tenure for the president.90 
The correlative right, the right to vote, has been judicially recognized 
but has received uneven protection. In discipline cases, the principle interest 
in membership protected by the courts is the right to participate in union 
government, and barring a member from voice and vote in the union is 
treated as equivalent to expulsion. In election cases the courts have indicated 
some willingness to inquire whether individual members have been arbitrarily 
denied the opportunity to vote either by lack of notice of the election 91 or 
improper requirements of proof of membership.92 The New York courts, 
however, have refused to protect against mass disenfranchisement. For ex- 
ample, the Operating Engineers have kept over half of its members in a 
non-voting status, spuriously classified as apprentices or as "B" members,93 
but the courts have turned a deaf ear to their appeals.94 The logic of the 
admission cases-that a union can wholly exclude from participation those 
whom it represents-is extended to permit the union to relegate dues paying 
members to second class citizenship. The fact that this logic is inconsistent 
with principles governing discipline and election cases generally is ignored 
by the courts. 
The secondary but significant right of members to select candidates of their 
choice likewise gets only partial protection. The right to receive notice of 
nomination meetings and have reasonable opportunity to make nominations 
has been recognized.95 Similarly individual candidates cannot be disqualified 
90. In 1943, Joseph Ryan was elected president of the International Longshoremen's 
Association for life. TAFT, THE STRUCTURE AND GOVERNMENT OF LABOR UNIONS 63 
(1954). This was never challenged in the courts, but he was removed in 1956 as a result of 
his conviction for accepting "Christmas gifts" from employers. United States v. Ryan, 
350 U.S. 299 (1956). The Hodcarriers had no convention or election of international officers 
for thirty years prior to 1941, and President Moreschi seemed to have obtained and held 
his position by a not so playful "king of the hill" contest. Although suits were brought to 
obtain elections at the local level, see Dusing v. Nuzzo, 263 App. Div. 59, 31 N.Y.S.2d 
849 (1941), no suit was brought to compel a national convention. See Note, Judicial In- 
tervention in Revolts Against Labor Union Leaders, 51 YALE L.J. 1372, 1377 (1942). 
91. See Fisher v. Kempter, 25 L.R.R.M. 2188 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1949). 
92. Cauley v. Quill, 139 N.Y.L.J., April 3, 1958, p. 6, col. 2 (Sup. Ct.). 
93. The union has a total dues paying membership of 280,000, but only 131,000 are 
"senior" members entitled to vote. The rest are classified as "junior" or "apprentice" 
members. Local 138 on Long Island had 500 "senior" members, 400 "apprentices," 300 "B" 
members, and 500 to 1,000 permit men. Senate Select Comm. on Improper Activities in 
the Labor or Management Field, Interim Report, S. REP. No. 1417, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 371, 
405-06 (1958). 
94. Kelly v. Moran, N.Y. Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty., June 10, 1958. 
95. Alaimo v. Rossiter, N.Y. Sup. Ct. Erie Cty., June 13, 1941. 
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because of alleged misconduct unless they are afforded the full measure of 
procedural and other safeguards required before a member can be disciplined. 
For example, in Di Bucci v. Uhrich,96 a candidate for local president was 
declared ineligible on the grounds that his conduct when he had previously 
held office did not meet the standards of the Ethical Practices Code. The 
court held that he could not be deprived of this "substantial right" of mem- 
bership without being given notice of the charges and fair opportunity to be 
heard.97 His summary disqualification violated due process as required by the 
Ethical Practices Code on Union Democratic Process. 
In spite of the prevailing judicial concern to protect the nomination pro- 
cess, some judges have at times closed their eyes to devices which discourage 
or prevent the nomination of opposition candidates. In Buscarello v. Gugliel- 
melli,98 for example, an opposition candidate for president was nominated for 
the first time in years. The incumbent president quickly declared the nomina- 
tions closed and ruled that the opponent's nomination failed for want of a 
second. The court refused to intervene to void this ruling. Similarly, in 
Harrison v. O'Neill,99 the incumbent president ruled that opposition can- 
didates were disqualified because they had not previously been members of 
the executive board. This ruling was based on an alleged amendment which, 
if it had in fact been adopted, was tailored to forestall opposition candidates 
and was adopted without the knowledge of the opposition group. Again, 
the court refused to intervene, apparently insensitive to the implications of 
the union's conduct and the need for judicial protection.'? 
C. The Standard of Honesty 
The courts insist, at the barest minimum, on an honest count of the ballots, 
and will not hesitate to look behind the results certified by union officers.'0' 
In Lacey v. O'Rourke 102 the international executive board of the Teamsters, 
after reviewing various challenges, designated O'Rourke winner of the elec- 
tion for president of Joint Council 16 in New York. The court examined the 
credentials of a number of delegates whose votes had been counted by the 
international executive board and found them invalid. It further inquired into 
96. 21 Misc. 2d 1069, 189 N.Y.S.2d 717 (Sup. Ct. 1959). 
97. See also Beiso v. Robilotto, 47 L.R.R.M. 2590 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1960); Mainculf 
v. Robinson, 19 Misc. 2d 230, 189 N.Y.S.2d 712 (Sup. Ct. 1958); but see Contes v. Ross, 
N.Y.L.J., June 12, 1951, p. 2175, col. 5 (Sup. Ct.). 
98. 43 L.R.R.M. 2753 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959). 
99. 26 L.R.R.M. 2294 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1950). 
100. The courts have not attempted to construe even potentially ambiguous pro- 
visions prescribing qualifications in favor of the member's right to be a candidate. See 
Litwin v. Novak, 9 App. Div. 2d 789, 193 N.Y.S.2d 310 (1959); Clarke v. Corr, 145 
N.Y.S.2d 125 (Sup. Ct. 1955); Kelman v. Kaplan, 91 N.Y.S.2d 165 (Sup. Ct. 1949). 
101. Carey v. International Bhd. of Paper Makers, 123 Misc. 680, 206 N.Y. Supp. 73 
(Sup. Ct. 1924); Roman v. Caputo, N.Y. Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty., July 3, 1951. 
102. 147 F. Supp. 922 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). 
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the creation of six new locals and found that they were but "paper locals" char- 
tered by the international officers for the purpose of affecting the outcome of 
the election. The court then declared Lacey the winner instead of O'Rourke. 
Similarly, in Mayer v. Hansen,'03 the court invalidated a referendum when 
it was shown that the international officers had transposed results to show a 
favorable rather than unfavorable vote.104 
Honesty in an election, however, is poorly protected by attempting to dis- 
cover fraud after it has been committed. Effective protection requires elaborate 
safeguards which will discourage or prevent fraud, but the courts have been 
reluctant to become involved in such intricate details. For example, in Gray 
v. Atkins,105 the election committee sought the aid of the court to control 
the number of ballots printed and to maintain strict accounting for all ballots 
mailed out, all ballots returned unclaimed, and all unused ballots, as well as the 
ballots returned marked. It also sought procedures to validate the voting list. The 
court refused to intervene to provide these safeguards, and thereby ushered in six 
years of disruption and litigation. Finally, when the local sought an election 
to terminate a trusteeship, the court appointed a referee to conduct the elec- 
tion and he provided these needed protections against potential fraud. 
Similar to the protection against dishonesty is the protection of the secrecy 
of the ballot when a secret ballot is required by the constitutional8 The courts 
have repeatedly voided elections and referenda when a standing or voice vote 
was substituted for a secret ballot.107 They have not, however, carefully 
scrutinized details of the voting procedure to insure that full secrecy was 
preserved. Thus, when members complained that the single envelope in 
which the mail ballot was enclosed failed to conceal the ballot marking, judge 
refused to stay the election, saying that whether the constitution requires an 
inside and outside envelope "presents some doubt."'08 
D. The Standard of Fair Competition 
The cases bear some traces of judicial concern to provide the contestants a 
measure of competitive equality, and lawyers feel that judges are often sen- 
sitive to manipulations of the election process which give one side an unfair ad- 
vantage. There is, however, no consistent pattern. Two election cases in the 
long legal battle in Local 88 of the Masters, Mates and Pilots illustrate the 
103. 260 App. Div. 150, 20 N.Y.S.2d 698 (1940). 
104. For a case in which the court inquired fully into alleged irregularities in the 
balloting and tabulation and ordered a rerun of the election in some of the voting sections 
of the union, see Bowman v. Horn, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 28, 1952, p. 372, col. 5 (Sup. Ct.). 
105. 122 N.Y.S.2d 36 (Sup. Ct. 1953). 
106. There is no evidence that the courts prefer the secret ballot to the extent of 
resolving doubts in favor of secrecy. See Rowan v. Possehl, 173 Misc. 898, 18 N.Y.S.2d 
574 (Sup. Ct. 1940). 
107. Fritsch v. Rarback, 199 Misc. 356, 98 N.Y.S.2d 748 (Sup. Ct. 1950); Waldman 
v. Ladisky, 101 N.Y.S.2d 87 (Sup. Ct. 1950). 
108. Eimans v. Gallagher, 17 Misc. 2d 213, 185 N.Y.S.2d 77, 78 (Sup. Ct. 1959). 
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extremes in judicial attitudes. In Gray v. Atkins,'" the election committee 
sought not only to insure honesty but also some measure of competitive 
equality by requiring that the union newspaper give equal space to the opposi- 
tion and that membership lists be available to all candidates. The court re- 
fused to aid the election committee in providing either honesty or equality. 
After the Court of Appeals in Madden v. Atkins 'IO had declared so force- 
fully that the judiciary must assume responsibility for protecting democratic 
processes in unions, the court was confronted with another election in Local 
88. In this election, held under the supervision of a court-appointed referee,111 
the union newspaper was required to remain impartial, no campaign literature 
was allowed to be printed or distributed at union expense, the emblem of the 
international could not be used on campaign literature, membership lists 
were to be available to any candidate and a copy provided for $4, and the 
ballots were to list candidates alphabetically without any indication who was 
an incumbent. 
Even where the court recognizes the need to insure competitive equality, 
its protection may be half-hearted and incomplete. In Contes v. Ross,.2 
the opposition group claimed that the election committee had been handpicked 
by the administration; that the committee had given the administration a 
campaign advantage by delaying passing on the qualifications of the opposi- 
tion candidates and then casting a cloud on their eligibility to hold office; 
that one leading member of the opposition slate had been placed in a separate 
row on the ballot as an independent, thus tending to confuse and divide the 
opposition vote; and that the local's newspaper, controlled by the adminis- 
trator, campaigned for the administration slate and bitterly attacked the op- 
position candidates. The plaintiffs asked that a supervisor be appointed to 
run the election, or in the alternative that the election be enjoined until 
these conditions were corrected. The court ordered the union newspaper to 
remain neutral and refrain from printing articles favoring any candidate, but 
gave no relief against the other alleged acts of unfairness. 
The court's concern for fairness may lead it to withhold its hand when it 
suspects that the litigation is but a maneuver to obtain a political advantage. 
In Fritsch v. Rarback,118 a leader of the opposition group sued to compel an 
election, claiming that the amendment extending the term of office from one 
109. 122 N.Y.S.2d 36 (Sup. Ct. 1953). 
110. 4 N.Y.2d 283, 174 N.Y.S.2d 633, 151 N.E.2d 73 (1958). 
111. Holdeman v. International Org. of Master Mates & Pilots, Sup. Ct. Kings 
County, Dec. 10, 1958; 7 App. Div. 2d 1021, 184 N.Y.S.2d 698; 6 N.Y.2d 869, 188 N.Y.S.2d 
987 (1959). 
112. N.Y.L.J., June 12, 1951, p. 2175, col. 5 (Sup. Ct.). 
113. 199 Misc. 356, 98 N.Y.S.2d 748 (Sup. Ct. 1950). This was part of an extended 
factional fight within the union which was repeatedly carried into the courtroom. The 
plaintiffs had succeeded in upsetting one referendum for lack of a secret ballot, Waldman v. 
Ladisky, 101 N.Y.S.2d 87 (Sup. Ct. 1950), and then apparently revived the issue as to 
earlier referenda which they had not questioned. They fared no better in a subsequent suit 
This content downloaded  on Thu, 14 Mar 2013 08:54:52 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
1961] UNION ELECTIONS 1241 
to two years was invalid because it had not been adopted by secret ballot as 
required by the constitution. The court held that the amendment had not 
been validly adopted, but refused to grant the requested relief. It noted that 
the plaintiff had waited for a year and a half after the amendment was adopted 
and brought suit less than three months before the requested election. "To 
grant the relief demanded at this late date", the court observed, "would not be 
an act of equity but an abetment of a tactical maneuver, hostile to the best in- 
terests of the membership."1114 
E. The Standard of Public Virtue. 
The courts never state that in deciding election disputes they will inquire 
into the relative virtue of the contestants, but the cases suggest that claims of 
communism and corruption carry weight not only at the polls but at the bar of 
justice. The marked tendency in discipline cases to deny judicial protection 
to alleged communists extends to the election cases where those so labelled have 
been singularly unsuccessful in obtaining legal relief.115 In one case, for ex- 
ample, candidates on an opposition slate were summarily disqualified for 
having brought suit against the union to contest a trusteeship summarily im- 
posed to eliminate communist influence and for "association with Commu- 
nists." The court refused to restore them to the ballot,116 even though discipline 
for bringing suit is generally against public policy and candidates cannot normal- 
ly be declared ineligible without procedural due process.117 
Judicial willingness to intervene in election disputes seems to be greatest 
when the court believes that the incumbent officers are corrupt. The two cases 
in which elections were ordered were ones in which local unions sought to 
to upset another referendum shortly before an election, allegedly for the purpose of blocking 
an election which they knew they could not win. Roman v. Caputo, Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty., 
July 3, (1951). 
114. Fritsch v. Rarback, 199 Misc. 356, 361, 98 N.Y.S.2d 748, 753 (Sup. Ct. 1950). 
115. In the fight in District 9 of the Painters, the left-wing group brought four suits to 
void referenda. They won the first, Waldman v. Ladisky, 101 N.Y.S.2d 87 (Sup. Ct. 1950) 
and obtained an effective injunction. In the second case they won a court declaration that the 
referendum was invalid but were denied relief because of laches. Fritsch v. Rarback, 199 
Misc. 356, 98 N.Y.S.2d 748 (Sup. Ct. 1950). In the third, they sued to invalidate an assess- 
ment levied by a referendum, only to have the court accept the international's reinterpretation 
that the assessment was "voluntary". Rubinow v. Ladisky, 198 Misc. 225, 97 N.Y.S.2d 526 
(Sup. Ct. 1950). The last was dismissed for lack of proof. Roman v. Caputo, Sup. Ct. N.Y. 
Cty., July 3, 1951. 
President Curran of the National Maritime Union has had uniformly good results in 
defeating election suits brought by the opposition who are regularly portrayed as "left-wing". 
See Ford v. Curran, 36 L.R.R.M. 2407 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1955); Mixon v. Curran, Sup. Ct. 
N.Y. Cty., June 17, 1954; Lawrenson v. Curran, N.Y.L.J. May 1, 1950, p. 1532, col. 4 (Sup. 
Ct.). 
116. Contes v. Ross, N.Y.L.J., June 12, 1951, p. 2175, col. 5 (Sup. Ct.). In the same case, 
the court enjoined the union newspaper from taking sides, but this was after it had published 
its last issue before the election. 
117. Di Bucci v. Uhrich, 21 Misc. 2d 1069, 189 N.Y.S.2d 717 (Sup. Ct. 1959) ; Maineculf 
v. Robinson, 19 Misc. 2d 230, 189 N.Y.S.2d 712 (Sup. Ct. 1958). 
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throw off corrupt and dictatorial trusteeships.18 The court's close scrutiny of 
the delegates' credentials in Lacey v. O'Rourke"19 was obviously induced by 
the proven corruption of some of the delegates and the transparent dishonesty 
of the international officers. The union's constitution may be narrowly inter- 
preted and strictly enforced to manufacture defects which will void the re- 
election of officers who have breached their trust ;120 but real and substantial 
defects may be ignored if the election has unseated such officers. For ex- 
ample, in Daley v. Stickel,121 two officers of Teamster Local 445 had 
been convicted of extortion. They were fearful that they could not 
control the nomination meeting, and on the morning before the meeting the 
executive committee met and announced that the meeting was adjourned until 
further notice. In spite of this, a large number of members assembled. The 
officers tried to send them home, but the opposition group took control, called 
the meeting to order and summarily expelled the two convicted officers. Nom- 
inations were called for, leaders of the opposition group were nominated with- 
out opposition and declared elected. When the old officers refused to recognize 
the new officers and ordered a new election, the court intervened. It found no 
defects in this rough and ready procedure; and dismissed the argument that 
many members had been deprived of their right to vote because of the adjourn- 
ment, with the distingenuous reply that this was no fault of those elected! 
The standard of public virtue is crude and inconclusive. The courts apply 
this standard only when they see the election contest as one between villians 
and heroes. Vice and virtue, however, are seldom so plainly parcelled, for the 
affidavits, testimony and oral arguments in these cases commonly resemble 
a pots and kettles contest in epithets.'22 Confronted by such countercharges, 
the court may resort to other standards as controlling. Thus in Di Bucci v. 
118 Dusing v. Nuzzo, 263 App. Div. 59, 31 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1941). Irwin v. Possehl, 143 
Misc. 855, 257 N.Y. Supp. 597 (Sup. Ct. 1932). In Yellin v. Schaefer, 46 L.R.R.M. 2723 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1960) the court's insistence that the union carry through an agreement made 
by one of its officers for a court supervised election obviously sprung the court's conviction 
that the union was being exploited by the officers as an instrument of private gain. 
119. 147 F. Supp. 922 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). 
120. Fisher v. Kempter, 25 L.R.R.M. 2188 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1949). The court found the 
officers owed the union $9,000, Fisher v. Kempter, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 21 1951, p. 578, col. 4 Sup. 
Ct. 
121. 2 App. Div. 2d 287, 153 N.Y.S.2d 886 (1956), aff'd, 6 App. Div. 2d 1, 174 N.Y.S.2d 
504 (1958). 
122. For example, in Kelly v. Moran, N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y. Cty., June 10, 1958, the 
plaintiffs in seeking to enjoin an election in a local of the Operating Engineers alleged that 
requirement hat candidates file their candidacy four months prior to the election was used to 
intimidate potential opposition because of fear for their jobs. They also alleged that they 
were denied a list of good standing members to check voters' eligibility and denied their 
quota of watchers at the polls. Furthermore, over half of the members were barred from 
voting by being classified as apprentices. The defendants replied that these were "barefaced, 
unexplained untruths" and "This motion is merely a classic example, happening all too 
frequently, of a small minority or handful of persons trying to rule a vast majority. It smacks 
of a technique foreign to the American way of life." 
In Fritsch v. Rarback, 199 Misc. 356, 98 N.Y.S.2d 748 (Sup. Ct. 1950), the defendant de- 
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Uhrich,123 the court restored to the ballot a candidate who had once been 
suspended from office for mishandling welfare funds. The affidavits and 
other information presented to the court, however, painted his old offense 
in grayer tones and did not leave those who had summarily stricken his 
name from the ballot unsmudged. His right to a fair hearing before being 
disqualified controlled over the inconclusive test of public virtue. 
These are the principle standards which seem to guide the courts in ad- 
judicating election disputes. The first four-the union constitution, demo- 
cratic rights, honesty, and fair competition-essentially supplement each 
other. The election may be required to fulfill all four. Constitutional clauses 
which clash with the other three standards can be construed to conform to 
them or, if necessary, can be declared void as contrary to public policy. These 
four standards are not only appropriate but absolutely essential, and the 
election process lacks full protection to the extent that the courts follow 
blindly the words of the constitution and fail to recognize the supervening 
claims of democratic rights, honesty and fair competition. The fifth stand- 
ard, that of public virtue, can clash irreconcilably with the other standards 
and the cases show that in spite of its inappropriateness it often prevails. 
In the application of all of the standards the courts manifest a recurring 
reluctance to become involved in the seemingly minor details of the election 
process. Stuffing the ballot box or misreporting the results will not be tol- 
erated, but requiring strict accounting for the ballots to prevent fraud does 
not always obtain judicial support. Disqualifying candidates without a hear- 
ing is summarily enjoined, but rules adopted to obstruct opposition nomina- 
tions may go unexamined. The integrity of the election, however, depends 
on these details and any meaningful protection of the process requires close 
judicial scrutiny at this level. Only the crude or incautious union officials 
flaunt the standards of honesty, democratic rights or fair competition; the 
shrewd and sophisticated rely on more subtle manipulations. Although the 
cases reveal that some judges do inquire closely into the details, many shun 
this responsibility and excuse themselves by echoing hollow doctrines of judi- 
cial non-intervention. As a result, the standards remain undeveloped and 
unpredictably enforced. 
III. TIMING OF JUDICIAL INTERVENTION 
Casting ballots is not the beginning but the culmination of the election 
process. Many of the disputes brought before the courts occur at stages of 
that process which precede the balloting. Many others which concern the 
dared that the plaintiff "actually represents only a handful of discredited Communists and 
fellow travelers". The plaintiff chided him for injecting "snide, wild flagrant charges of 
communism" and then suggested that the defendants hands were not so clean in that he 
had allegedly condoned the conduct of a notorious gangster who had been an officer in the 
union. 
123. 21 Misc. 1069, 189 N.Y.S.2d 717 (Sup. Ct. 1959). 
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balloting itself, such as eligibility to vote, time of the election, location of the 
polling places and the form of the ballot, grow out of union decisions made and 
known before election day. Relatively few new disputes arise after the voting 
begins, although objections may not be voiced until the returns have pro- 
duced a disappointed candidate. 
Judicial intervention may be sought either before the voting to prevent or 
correct alleged defects, or after the voting to set aside the election because 
of alleged defects. When mail ballots are used and voting extends over weeks 
or months, injunctions may be sought in the midst of that process either to 
void the voting 124 or to protect the handling of the ballots.125 The willing- 
ness of the courts to intervene, the form of remedy provided, and the effective- 
ness of judicial intervention depend largely upon the time when the dispute is 
brought before the court. 
A. Preelection Remedies 
The great majority of suits are in fact brought prior to the voting, and the 
New York courts have not hesitated to correct the process in mid-course. 
If members are forcibly prevented from making nominations,126 of if candi- 
dates are wrongfully stricken from the ballot,127 the election must be a nullity. 
To postpone adjudicating the dispute would burden the union with carrying 
through a useless form. If the union newspaper campaigns for the administra- 
tion candidate, or the ballot is arranged to confuse or handicap the opposition, 
a new election may not be required, for the opposition may win in spite of the 
obstacles and moot the case. This possibility of ultimate avoidance, however, 
has not led the courts to await the outcome of the election.'28 
The willingness of the courts to intervene before the election springs from 
several sources. First, correction of invalidating defects saves the union not 
124. Eimans v. Gallagher, 17 Misc. 2d 213, 185 N.Y.S.2d 77 (Sup. Ct. 1959) (suit to 
enjoin counting of ballots because enclosed in only a single envelope); Mixon v. Curran, 
N.Y. Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty., June 17, 1954 (suit to enjoin counting of ballots until eligibility 
of rival determined); Lawrenson v. Curran, N.Y.L.J., May 1, 1950, p. 1532, col. 4 (Sup. 
Ct) (suit to enjoin sending out of mail ballots because they did not conform to sample 
ballot). 
125. Gray v. Atkins, 122 N.Y.S.2d 36 (Sup. Ct. 1953). 
126. Alaimo v. Rossiter, N.Y. Sup. Ct. Erie Cty., May 23, 1941. 
127. Di Bucci v. Uhrich, 21 Misc. 2d 1069 189 N.Y.S.2d 717 (Sup. Ct. 1959); 
Maineculf v. Robinson, 19 Misc. 2d 230 189 N.Y.S.2d 712 (Sup. Ct. 1958). 
128. In Litwin v. Novak, 45 L.R.R.M. 2021 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959), the trial court 
refused to enjoin the union from holding a new election on the grounds that the plaintiff 
who won the first election might also win the second election, and so was not irreparably 
injured. This was reversed on appeal on the grounds that holding the second election was 
contrary to the constitution. 9 App. Div. 2d 789, 193 N.Y.S.2d 310 (1959). See also Beiso 
v. Robilotto, 47 L.R.R.M. 2590 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1960); Contes v. Ross, N.Y.L.J., June 
12, 1951, p. 2175, col. 5 (Sup. Ct); Lawrenson v. Curren, N.Y.L.J., May 1, 1950, p. 1532, 
col. 4 (Sup. Ct.). 
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only the costs of a new election,129 but more importantly, the internal disrup- 
tion caused by the lack of legitimatized leadership and the turmoil of another 
and more bitter campaign. These costs are too great to risk on the chance, 
usually remote, that those injured by the defects may win and that intervention 
will become unnecessary. Second, correction of invalidating defects before the 
election simplifies the court's function and lightens its responsibilities. It 
saves the court from inquiring whether the defect provided the margin of 
victory, or even deciding whether that inquiry is relevant. It also saves the 
court from the hard choice of either ratifying the results of an imperfect pro- 
cess or imposing on the union the burden of a new election. Third, even 
though the alleged defects have no merit and would not void the election, 
adjudication before the voting prevents the unsettled legal issue from dis- 
torting the process or clouding its outcome. Counting the ballots ends the 
contest and brings stability, instead of ushering in an extended period of 
uncertainty created by litigation. 
The cases make clear that the courts have not only been willing but have 
preferred to adjudicate disputes prior to the voting.'30 In Ford v. Curran 131 
a defeated candidate for vice-president of the National Maritime Union 
brought suit to set aside the election because President Curran had used the 
union newspaper to campaign against the opposition slate. The court found 
that this electioneering violated an express provision in the union constitution 
but refused to set aside the election. "A person in her position" the court 
declared, "could not sit back and await the outcome of the election and then 
come into this court and get the extreme relief she seeks." Although the court 
would have corrected the defect before the election, it would not remedy it by 
ordering a new election.'32 
129. For example, Contes v. Ross, N.Y.L.J., June 12, 1951, p. 2175, col. 5 (Sup. Ct.), 
it was alleged that holding an election for the local cost $26,000. In international unions, 
the cost may be many times this amount, and if the officers are elected by delegates a new 
election requires a convention. This may cost upwards of a million dollars. See Testimony 
of President A.J. Hayes, International Association of Machinists, Hearings Before 
Subcommittee on Labor of The Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, U.S. 
Senate, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1958), at p. 555; LEISERSON, AMERICAN TRADE UNION 
DEMOCRACY 136-40 (1959). 
130. In enjoining the holding of an unauthorized election, the court in Caliendo v. 
McFarland, 175 N.Y.S.2d 869, 877 (1958) said 
Plaintiffs have a recognized, substantial, legally enforceable right to the specific 
performance of the provisions of the contract between the union and its members. 
The nature of this right is such that money damages for an infringement thereof, 
either can not be estimated or do not afford adequate or compelete relief. In such 
case, equity's mission to enforce the legal right is clear, namely, intervention before 
the threatened commission of the wrong-this, rather than subject the suppliant to 
an inadequate legal remedy available only subsequent to the injury. Equity favors 
relief which prevents a wrong in preference to that which may afford redress. 
131. 36 L.R.R.M. 2407 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1955). 
132. For a similar indication of reluctance to upset an election already held, see 
O'Connell v. O'Leary, 167 Misc. 324, 2 N.Y.S.2d 833 (Sup. Ct. 1938); Eimans v. Gallagher, 
17 Misc. 2d 213, 185 N.Y.S.2d 77 (Sup. Ct. 1959). 
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To obtain an adjudication before the election requires quick action, but the 
courts have proven themselves capable of more than deliberate speed. In 
Maineculf v. Robinson the plaintiff was nominated for business agent of 
Local 968 of the I.L.A. on January 6 for an election to be held on February 1. 
On January 20 he was notified that Captain Bradley, the international presi- 
dent, had disqualified him because he had testified against I.L.A. officials before 
the Waterfront Commission. On January 24, he brought suit, and on January 30 
the court granted a temporary injunction prohibiting the union from striking his 
name from the ballot.'33 Similarly, in Contes v. Ross134 a number of disputes 
arose between May 29 and June 4 concerning disqualification of candidates, use 
of the union newspaper, form of the ballot and other alleged abuses. Suit was 
brought for a temporary injunction on June 5, a hearing held on June 8 ad- 
judicating all of the issues, and the election held on June 15. Even when the 
alleged defects lack merit, the courts are equally prompt in rendering a de- 
cision.135 
Suits brought before the election are always for a temporary injunction, 
and where time does not permit a hearing, judges have been willing to grant 
an order to show cause with an ex parte restraining order until a hearing can 
be held.'36 Denial of a temporary injunction is almost always in fact dispositive 
of the case, for the election is usually held before there can be a hearing on the 
permanent injunction, and the plaintiff does not pursue his claim by seeking 
to set the election aside.'37 If the temporary injunction is granted, the union 
may correct the defect and proceed with the election, or postpone the election 
pending determination of the permanent injunction.'38 
133. Maineculf v. Robinson, 19 Misc. 2d 230, 189 N.Y.S.2d 712 (Sup. Ct. 1958). For 
a similar case in which a candidate wrongfully disqualified obtained a temporary in- 
junction blocking the election until his name was restored, see Di Bucci v. Uhrich, 21 
Misc. 2d 1069, 189 N.Y.S.2d 717 (Sup. Ct. 1959). However, a member who fails to pursue 
readily available legal proceedings to test his suspension from membership will not be 
given a temporary injunction to avoid the consequences of that suspension. Gould v. 
Murray, 47 L.R.R.M. 2252 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1960). 
134. N.Y.L.J., June 12, 1951, p. 2175, col. 5. (Sup. Ct.). 
135. In Kelly v. Moran, Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty., June 10, 1958, the show cause order was 
signed and served on Friday, returnable on Tuesday. The motion for temporary injunc- 
tion was heard on Tuesday morning, decision rendered on Tuesday afternoon and election 
held on Wednesday evening as scheduled. Similarly, in Paully v. Milling, Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty., 
May 26, 1953, the show cause order was signed on May 22, the motion for temporary 
injunction heard and decided on May 26, and the election held on May 27. In Kelman v. 
Kaplan, 91 N.Y.S.2d 165 (Sup. Ct. 1949), the show cause order was signed only three days 
before the election, and was heard and decided the day of the election. 
136. See, e.g., Harrison v. O'Neill, 26 L.R.R.M. 2294 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1950) (ex 
parte stay issued, temporary injunction denied); Lawrenson v. Curran, N.Y.L.J., May 1, 
1950, p. 1532, col. 4 (Sup. Ct.) (ex parte stay issued but later withdrawn); Aliamo v. 
Rossiter, N.Y. Sup. Ct. Erie Cty., May 23, 1941 (ex parte stay issued, temporary in- 
junction granted). 
137. See, e.g., Contes v. Ross, N.Y.L.J., June 12, 1951, p. 2175, col. 5 (Sup. Ct.). 
138. See, e.g., Di Bucci v. Uhrich, 21 Misc. 2d 1069, 189 N.Y.S.2d 717 (Sup. Ct. 1959). 
If the plaintiff seeks to block the holding of the election, rather than merely correct a defect, 
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Temporary injunction procedures limit the thoroughness of judicial inquiry, 
for the court must rely almost entirely on affidavits and assertions by counsel. 
Close study of the cases, however, suggests that the judges are in fact quite 
fully informed, not only as to the specific issues, but also as to the background 
of the whole election contest. 
B. Post-Election Remedies 
The New York courts will review an election after the balloting,'39 but 
the limited value of post-election remedies is attested by the fact that only 
one case has been found in which the court has ordered a new election '40-and 
that was one in which the officers who had been reelected were charged and 
later found guilty of misuse of union funds.'4' If the defects arose prior to the 
voting and could have been raised at that time, a protest coming after the 
election may be declared to be too late. Once the election is finished, the 
decisions of election committees, canvassing boards or union officials seem to 
gain an increased presumption of regularity.'42 Through the cases runs a 
visible judicial reluctance to impose on the union the financial burden and 
internal disruption which comes with voiding an election and ordering a new 
one.'43 
The most difficult problem confronting the court in post-election cases is 
determining whether the defect was substantial enough to void the election. 
The reluctance to order a new election has led the courts to impose on the 
plaintiff the impossible task of showing that his defeat was caused by the 
defect.'44 Thus, in one case the court found that the union newspaper had 
been improperly used to attack the opposition slate, but it refused to set 
aside the election saying that there was "no evidence that these articles 
affected the results of the election."'45 The judge gave no hint what "evidence" 
might conceivably be produced. In another case, the plaintiff claimed that 
then the case may be carried to determination of the permanent injunction. See, e.g., Daley 
v. Stickel, 6 App. Div. 2d 1, 174 N.Y.S.2d 504 (1958); Caliendo v. McFarland, 13 Misc. 2d 
183, 175 N.Y.S.2d 869 (Sup. Ct. 1958). 
139. Cauley v. Quill, N.Y.L.J., April 3, 1958, p. 6, col. 2 (Sup. Ct.); O'Connell v. 
O'Leary, 167 Misc. 324, 3 N.Y.S.2d 833 (1938); Carey v. International Bhd. of Paper 
Makers, 123 Misc. 680, 206 N.Y. Supp. 73 (1924). 
140. Fisher v. Kempter, 25 L.R.R.M. 2188 (Sup. Ct. 1949). 
141. See Fisher v. Kempter, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 21, 1951, p. 578 col. 4 (Sup. Ct.). 
142. Collins v. Hamer, 46 L.R.R.M. 2633 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty., 1960); Kennedy v. 
Doyle, 140 N.Y.S.2d 899 (1955); O'Connell v. O'Leary, 167 Misc. 324, 3 N.Y.S.2d 833 
(1938); Carey v. International Bhd. of Paper Makers, 123 Misc. 680, 206 N.Y. Supp. 
73 (1924). 
143. For this purpose, most suits brought during the period of balloting by mail should 
be considered as post-election, for the defect may be beyond correction and any remedy 
would require a new election. See, e.g., Eimans v. Gallagher, 17 Misc. 2d 213, 185 N.Y.S.2d 
77 (1959); Mixon v. Curran, Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty., June 17, 1954. 
144. Compare Rowan v. Possehl, 173 Misc. 898, 18 N.Y.S.2d 574 (Sup. Ct. 1940). 
145. Ford v. Curran, 36 L.R.R.M. 2407, 2410 (Sup. Ct. 1955). 
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other candidates who ran against him but were also defeated were not 
qualified to run, and that the election was therefore void. The court dis- 
missed his claim saying that there was no indication that he would have re- 
ceived any larger proportion of the votes.148 
The test apparently applied by the courts-whether the defect provided the 
margin of victory-is not only impossible to administer but overlooks one of 
the most important functions of union elections. Opposition groups in unions 
frequently have no serious expectation of winning but seek only to voice a 
protest and perhaps build a base for future elections. Defects in the election 
blunt the edge of their protest and undermine their base for the future; an in- 
flated majority solidifies the administration's power and discourages others 
from attempting to protest or challenge the incumbents. The very lack of a 
two-party system in most unions requires that the strength of the opposition 
be measured accurately. This is doubly true in elections of international officers 
where defeating the incumbents is extremely difficult and most elections serve 
little purpose other than as a focus for protest. 
Study of the cases emphasizes the importance of judicial intervention be- 
fore the voting. Lawyers who have been involved in these cases agree that 
preelection remedies are the only ones of any practical value. Correction of 
defects prior to the voting gives the members that to which they are entitled 
-a fair and honest election in the first instance. It also protects the union 
from the instability of an unsettled election and the cost and disruption of a 
new election. Post-election remedies provide too little protection for the 
members and too much burden for the union. 
C. Exhaustion of Internal Union Remedies 
The exception-riddled doctrine that courts will not intervene in internal 
union disputes until all appeals within the union have been exhausted has 
little practical impact on the timing of judicial intervention in election dis- 
putes. In nearly half of the cases there is no trace that the question of ex- 
haustion was ever raised. In a number of others the files show that the issue 
was argued by the parties but was apparently by-passed by the court which 
disposed of the case on its substantive merits with no mention of the doc- 
trine.147 If the court can not ignore the issue, the doctrine presents no in- 
superable handicap to immediate intervention, for one or more of the multiple 
exceptions are always available to excuse exhaustion. 
The doctrine has never required resort to all internal appeals, but only those 
reasonably available,148 for the doctrine must accommodate the competing 
146. O'Connell v. O'Leary, 167 Misc. 324, 3 N.Y.S.2d 833 (Sup. Ct. 1938). 
147. See, e.g., Clarke v. Corr, 145 N.Y.S.2d 125 (Sup. Ct. 1955); Paully v. Milling, 
Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty., May 26, 1953; Alaimo v. Rossiter, Sup. Ct. Erie Cty., May 23, 1941. 
148. "The obligation imposed on them as union members, if any such obligation existed in 
the circumstances at bar, was no more than to employ all reasonable means to utilize the 
remedies available to them within the Union organization before resorting to the courts...." 
Caliendo v. McFarland, 13 Misc. 2d 183, 190, 175 N.Y.S.2d 869, 877 (Sup. Ct. 1958). 
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interests in preserving union autonomy and protecting the rights of members. 
These underlying policies are reflected in two established exceptions-appeals 
need not be made if they are obviously fruitless or if their determination will 
be too long delayed. These two exceptions have special impact in election 
cases. 
Election disputes seldom provide time for protracted appeals, particularly 
if the dispute is to be adjudicated before the voting. The time between nomin- 
ations and voting may be only a matter of days, or at most weeks, even in 
large widely scattered locals.149 It is in this interim that most of the defects 
occur and some of them, such as the form of the ballot, may become known 
only a day or two before the voting.150 The most that time permits is a letter 
or telegram to the international president. The courts have generally not 
required more,151 and at times have excused even this in preelection cases.152 
In post-election cases the need for speed is also great, for those who have 
been declared victors may use their possession of office to entrench themselves 
and gain a significant advantage in the new election.153 By the time an appeal 
is heard by the international convention, they may have served nearly the 
whole of the contested term. 
Appeals which do not suffer from slowness-those to the international 
officers-are frequently futile in election cases. If a local union seeks to obtain 
an election to throw off an oppressive trusteeship, the appeal would be to the 
very officers who imposed and continued the trusteeship.'" In the words of 
the court in Dusing v. Nuzzo,155 "The futility of applying to an organization 
thus antipathetic to the election process ... need not be labored." Similarly, 
in Maineculf v. Robinson,156 the court held that a candidate whose name had 
149. For example, in Local 30 of the Operating Engineers which includes 4000 
building engineers in office and apartment buildings in New York City, less than a month 
elapsed between nominations and the election. Kelly v. Moran, Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty., June 
10, 1958. Moreover, in Local 6 of the Hotel and Restaurant Employees with 30,000 
members working throughout Manhattan, only two weeks elapsed between nominations 
and the election. Contes v. Ross, 25 pt. 2 N.Y.L.J., 2175 1751. In Local 1511 of the 
Painters, the time from nomination to election was 8 days. Kelman v. Kaplan, 91 N.Y.S.2d 
165 (Sup. Ct. 1949). 
150. See, e.g., Lawrenson v. Curran, 123 pt. 2 N.Y.L.J. 1532 where the defect in the 
ballot was apparently not discovered until the day before voting was to begin. 
151. The prevailing judicial attitude was clearly stated in Beiso v. Robilotto, 47 
L.R.R.M. 2590, 2591-92 (Sup. Ct. Albany Cty., 1960). "Time is of the essence in the 
enforcement of any rights they believe they might here have and the court does not conceive 
that the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies means that they should sit idly by during the 
short period from nominations to elections without seeking the aid and assistance of the 
courts." 
152. McCrave v. Severino 249 App. Div. 112, 291 N.Y. Supp. 303 (1936). Compare 
Wilkens v. Sofield, 144 N.Y.S.2d 78 (Sup. Ct. 1955). 
153. See Lacey v. O'Rourke, 147 F. Supp. 922 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). 
154. Irwin v. Possehl, 143 Misc. 855, 257 N.Y. Supp. 597 (Sup. Ct. 1932). Compare 
Canfield v. Moreschi, 180 Misc. 153, N.Y.S.2d 757 (Sup. Ct. 1943). 
155. 177 Misc. 35, 37,29 N.Y.S.2d 882, 885 (Sup. Ct. 1941). 
156. 19 Misc. 2d 230, 189 N.Y.S.2d 712 (Sup. Ct. 1958). 
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been stricken from the ballot need not make the "futile gesture" of appealing 
to the District Council whose ruling had led to his disqualification, and any 
further appeals would not be resolved before the election.l57 In some cases, 
such as Lacey v. O'Rourke 158 the election may actually have been rigged by 
the very international officers to whom the appeal would be made, and in 
other cases the court has found that the international officers have acquiesced if 
not participated in the alleged defect.159 
Disputes arising out of the election of international union officers have no 
practical forum for appeal. Even though the dispute relates only to the election 
of one of the subordinate officers, the other officers are seldom neutral but 
actively support one or the other of the competing candidates. For example, 
President Curran of the National Maritime Union is often unopposed, but an 
anti-administration slate contests the other offices, and Curran does not remain 
a passive or disinterested by-stander.160 Appeals to the convention, even if they 
do not come too late, are of little practical value, for the incumbent officers 
normally control the convention committees and dominate the proceedings. 
If neither of these two exceptions are available, the court may not require 
exhaustion of internal appeals by finding that the proceedings within the 
union are without jurisdiction and void. As stated in Caliendo v. McFar- 
land,162 
If the action of the union is without jurisdiction, or is without notice or 
authority, or not in compliance with the union rules, constitutional pro- 
visions, or is void for any reason, a member may appeal directly to the 
courts without first exhausting internal remedies. 
This third exception effectively negates the requirement of exhaustion, for it 
is applicable whenever the plaintiff has a meritorious claim. Thus in Fisher 
v. Kempter,163 the court voided an election for lack of the required notice, 
declaring bluntly, "Plaintiffs need not exhaust their remedies within the 
association where ... their legal rights were violated by an election which did 
not comply with the requirements of the International Constitution." The 
fact that this third exception has not been used as frequently in the 
election cases as in the discipline cases does not detract from its nullifying 
potential. The two legitimate exceptions of delay and futility are so commonly 
available in election cases that there is no need to resort to this spurious excep- 
tion. 
157. See also DiBucc v. Uhrich, 21 Misc. 2d 1069, 189 N.Y.S.2d 717 (Sup. Ct. 1959). 
158. 147 F. Supp. 922 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). 
159. Caliendo v. MvFarland, 13 Misc. 2d 183, 175 N.Y.S.2d 869 (Sup. Ct. 1958); 
Daley v. Stickel, 6 App. Div. 2d 1, 174 N.Y.S.2d 504 (1958). 
160. See, e.g., Ford v. Curran, 36 L.R.R.M. 2407 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1955). 
161. For a vivid description of the control normally exercised by the officers over the 
convention, see LEISERSON, AMERICAN TRADE UNION DEMOCRACY chs. 7, 9, 10 (1959). 
162. 13 Misc. 2d 183, 189, 175 N.Y.S.2d 869, 876 (Sup. Ct. 1958). 
163. 25 L.R.R.M. 2188, 2189 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1949). 
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The reach of these exceptions does not mean that the rule is never applied,'64 
for the courts do not always make full use of the available exceptions. Study 
of the cases makes clear that the judge's willingness to excuse exhaustion 
depends largely on his judgment of the underlying merits of the case. Thus 
in Daley v. Stickel,'65 where an opposition group was seeking to oust con- 
victed extortioners, the court "liberally construed" the complaint to find 
sufficient allegations that internal appeals would be futile. In Kelman v. Kap- 
lan,166 however, a candidate who had apparently been properly disqualified 
was told that he must wait for a decision by the international executive board 
even though the judge knew that no such decision would be made until a 
month after the election. In one or two cases, however, application of the 
exhaustion rule can be charitably explained only as a throwback to the 
primitive judicial refusal to intervene.'67 In Gray v. Atkins,'68 the election 
committee sought a temporary injunction to enable it to enforce certain 
minimum safeguards in the handling of mail ballots, obtain a membership list 
with the financial standing of the members, and to require that each candidate 
be given equal access to the union mailing list and union newspaper. The 
suit was directed against Atkins, the president of both the local and the in- 
ternational and who had ousted the committee from control of the election. 
The motion for a temporary injunction was made on October 21 and the 
election was to conclude on December 1, but the judge refused to rule on the 
motion until January 26, seven weeks after the election. He then dismissed 
the complaint on the grounds that the election committee had failed to exhaust 
its internal appeals to the international executive board-a board presided over, 
if not dominated, by Atkins. This was described by the judge as "a complete 
and workable system of procedure .. . which adequately protects the plaintiffs 
in all their rights."189 
The predominant pattern in the cases is one of early judicial intervention 
in election disputes with a strong preference for getting all possible disputes 
adjudicated before the voting. The courts do not allow the exhaustion doctrine 
to obstruct early intervention. Appeals beyond the international president, 
which are in fact commonly futile and too long delayed, are regularly excused. 
164. See, e.g., Redler v. Sanginari, 5 L.R.R.M. 954 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1940); Gleicher 
v. Piazzo, 4 L.R.R.M. 850 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1939). 
165. 2 App. Div. 2d 287, 153 N.Y.S.2d 886 (1956). 
166. 91 N.Y.S.2d 165 (Sup. Ct. 1949). 
167. In Mixon v. Curran, Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty., June 17, 1954, the plaintiff complained 
that his rival was not qualified. The court required exhaustion, suggesting that if the union 
tribunals found he was not qualified, the plaintiff would get the office. The plaintiff realistical- 
ly, but futilely, argued that no decision would be made until after the election, and if the 
rival won the executive board would appoint a replacement other than the plaintiff who was 
opposing the administration. See also Harrison v. O'Neill, 26 L.R.R.M. 2294 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1950) where the court related the plaintiff to nearly hopeless appeals because the court 
thought the plaintiff's case lacked merit. 
168. 122 N.Y.S.2d 36 (Sup. Ct. 1953). 
169. Id. at 37. 
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The exhaustion doctrine is used primarily as a cloak which, at best, half-con- 
ceals a judgment on the merits. Atavistic decisions like Gray v. Atkins serve 
only to remind us that the doctrine can be used by judges who are determined 
to pass by on the other side.170 
IV. SCOPE OF JUDICIAL INTERVENTION 
After the court finds defects in the election process requiring judicial in- 
tervention, it must determine the form and extent of that intervention. The 
effectiveness of legal remedies depends largely on the willingness of the court 
to use the strong and supple hand of equity to insure an honest, democratic 
and fair election. The residue of reluctance to intervene, however, at times 
weakens the will to use the means at hand. 
In many cases the remedy required is simple. If union officers attempt to 
upset a valid election and improperly order a rerun, the court can declare those 
elected the first time to be the properly elected officers and enjoin the holding 
of a new election.171 If an attempt is made to hold an election prematurely 172 or 
in an improper election district,178 the remedy is again simply to enjoin the 
election. In these cases the courts have not faltered. Defects which arise prior 
to voting, however, can present more difficult problems. If candidates have been 
wrongfully disqualified the court can enjoin the union from striking their 
names 174 or enjoin the holding of the election until their names are restored.175 
If the ballot is improperly arranged, its use can be enjoined until it is corrected. 
At this point, however, the court may become more deeply involved, for it may 
be called upon to prescribe the proper form. Similarly, disputes over time and 
place of voting, the number of poll watchers, and similar details may require 
the court to make regulations governing the election, and the union constitu- 
tion may give no guide. The courts do not lack the legal tools for such tasks, 
but the cases suggest that they are reluctant to become burdened with such 
details, particularly if a number are presented in the same case.176 Disputes 
over the use of the union newspaper present an additional problem, for such 
disputes normally do not arise until it has already been used by one side. 
Enjoining further partisanship is not only difficult to enforce but also fails to 
170. For a similar case in which the court seemed to reach out for the exhaustion 
doctrine to avoid giving aid to a plaintiff who had been blocked from being a candidate by 
the heavy hand of the incumbent, see Buscarello v. Guglielmelli, 43 L.R.R.M. 2753 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1959). 
171. Litwin v. Novak, 9 App. Div. 2d 789, 193 N.Y.S.2d 310 (1959); Daley v. 
Stickel, 6 App. Div. 2d 1, 174 N.Y.S.2d 504 (1958). 
172. Maddock v. Reul, 143 Misc. 914, 256 N.Y. Supp. 915 (Sup. Ct. 1932). 
173. Caliendo v. McFarland, 13 Misc. 2d 183, 175 N.Y.S.2d 869 (Sup. Ct. 1958). 
174. Maineculf v. Robinson, 19 Misc. 2d 230, 189 N.Y.S.2d 712 (Sup. Ct. 1958). 
175. Di Bucci v. Uhrich, 21 Misc. 2d 1069, 189 N.Y.S.2d 717 (Sup. Ct. 1959); 
Alaimo v. Rossiter, Sup. Ct. Erie Cty., May 23, 1941. 
176. See Kelly v. Moran, Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty., June 10, 1958; Gray v. Atkins, 122 
N.Y.S.2d 36 (Sup. Ct. 1953); Contes v. Ross, 125 pt. 2 N.Y.L.J., 2175, (1951). 
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rectify the wrong.177 The alternative is to require equal access which again re- 
quires close attention by the courts. 
The study of election cases shows that the great majority of them can be dis- 
posed of with relatively simple remedies. The disputes involve detailed 
elements of the election process, the factual background may be complex, 
and the standards to be applied may be unclear, but the court is seldom asked 
to become extensively involved in regulating the process. Narrow intervention, 
though in depth, neither frightens nor frustrates the courts. Serious problems 
arise, however, where narrow intervention is not adequate to insure a fair elec- 
tion. This problem becomes particularly acute when the court compels an elec- 
tion to free a local union from trusteeship, for there may be special reasons to 
fear that the trustee and the international officers who are administering the 
local will exploit every possibility to retain effective control.178 
Two interesting case histories of extensive judicial intervention suggest 
the alternatives available and their relative advantages. Local 17 of the Hod 
Carriers had been held in trusteeship for four years, ruled with an iron 
hand by Nuzzo, its trustee who suspended meetings, siphoned off $160,000 
of local funds, and blacklisted all who protested.179 In Dusing v. Nuzzo,180 
the court ordered the holding of an election. In addition to requiring com- 
pliance with the numerous provisions in the union constitution, the elaborate 
and meticulously drawn decree, filled gaps in the constitution by specifying 
the time and place of the nominating meeting, requiring that notice of the 
meeting be mailed to all members and conspicuously posted in certain places, 
defining the duties and procedures of the election committee, fixing the 
polling places and the hours for voting, requiring notices of the election by 
mail and posting and regulating the form of the ballots, the use of voting 
machines, proof of qualifications to vote, and the number of watchers at the 
polls. The election was held in February, 1942 and the insurgents won a 
clear-cut victory. The court, however, had overlooked one detail-the con- 
stitution provided that the length of the term of office, between the limits of 
one and five years, should be determined at the nomination meeting, but 
this was not mentioned in the decree. The constitution also provided that 
elections should be held at the first regular meeting in June. Seizing on this, 
the international officers ruled that the newly elected officers' terms expired 
in June and ordered a new election. The local sought to have the order 
177. See Contes v. Ross, supra note 176. The court enjoined the newspaper from 
taking sides in the election after the last pre-election issue had been published. 
178. The study has indicated that when a local is freed from trusteeship, the international 
officers commonly conceive it as part of their function to see that the local is placed in 
"responsible" hands. Indeed, they may not willingly permit an election until they feel 
reasonably sure of the outcome. 
179. For a history of the early stages of this litigation see Note, Judicial Intervention 
in Revolts Against Labor Union Leaders, 51 YALE L.J. 1372, 1377-79 (1942). 
180. 263 App. Div. 59, 31 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1941), 
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amended to provide that the officers should serve for one year, but the court 
disowned any further responsibility: 
The courts can not undertake to run the labor unions in detail or to 
interpret their laws upon every point of internal controversy The 
judgment . . can not be amended to embrace other controversies 
arising from time to time . . .181 
Encouraged by this, the international reimposed the trusteeship and proceeded to 
an election free of court supervision. When the election committee, controlled 
by the trustee, refused to disqualify Nuzzo as a candidate for president, al- 
though he had already been shown to have stolen the union treasury and was 
then under indictment for embezzlement, the local executive board voted to 
postpone the election two weeks. In spite of this, the trustee proceeded to 
hold an election on the original date, at which Nuzzo was elected. Two weeks 
later the local executive board held another election at which the insurgents 
were reelected. Not surprisingly, the international officers, confirmed Nuzzo's 
election, though scarcely before he was convicted of embezzlement and sen- 
tenced to Sing Sing for ten to twenty years. The court then belatedly felt com- 
pelled to intervene, and in Canfield v. Moreschi,182 found that the local executive 
board's postponing of the election was within its emergency power and con- 
firmed the insurgents in office. Thus, the court finally achieved the original 
purpose of protecting the members' "substantial right to elect their own 
responsible officers." 
Quite a different method was used to accomplish a judicially decreed election 
in Local 88 of the Masters', Mates and Pilots.183 After the court refused to 
intervene in Gray v. Atkins,184 the entrenched group retaliated against the 
opposition by expelling its leaders. Early in 1958 they were ordered rein- 
stated by the Court of Appeals,'85 and almost simultaneously Atkins was 
convicted of bribery for "back-door shipping."'86 When Atkins sought to 
resign as president of the local and name a president pro-tem, the opposition 
group seized control of the meeting, suspended the officers, and elected new 
temporary officers. The international then imposed a trusteeship.'87 In ter- 
minating this trusteeship, the court did not attempt to write a decree regulat- 
ing the details of the election, but obtained a stipulation that it should be con- 
ducted by a court-appointed administrator.'88 In spite of the background of 
181. Dusing v. Nuzzo, 178 Misc. 965, 966, 37 N.Y.S.2d 750, 752 (Sup. Ct. 1942). 
182. 182 Misc. 195, 49 N.Y.S.2d 903 (Sup. Ct. 1943). 
183. For a history of this internal fight, see Captains in Revolt, Progressive, Sept. 1960, 
p. 38; One Union's Fight for Democracy, New America, Sept. 5, 1960. 
184. 122 N.Y.S.2d 36 (Sup. Ct. 1953). 
185. Madden v. Atkins, 4 N.Y.2d 713, 171 N.Y.S.2d 103, 148 N.E.2d 314 (1958). 
186. N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1958, p. 18. 
187. For an account of these events, see Ash v. Holdeman, 13 Misc. 2d 411, 180 N.Y.S.2d 
126 (Sup. Ct. 1958); 13 Misc. 2d 528, 175 N.Y.S.2d 135 (Sup. Ct. 1958). 
188. See Holdeman v. National Org. of Masters, 41 L.R.R.M. 2847 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1958). Stipulation approved, Sup. Ct., Kings Cty., Dec. 10, 1958. 
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bitter litigation, distrust and violence, the administrator was able to resolve 
all disputes as they arose.189 He issued detailed rules prescribing the pro- 
cedure for making nominations, ruled on all challenges to eligibility of office, 
determined the form of the ballot and the safeguards to be used in handling 
mail ballots. Reinforced by broad powers, he was able to obtain agreement 
from the parties on most points, including the right of any candidate to a copy 
of the membership list and a prohibition against the printing of any campaign 
literature at union expense. He ultimately counted the ballots and ruled on 
all challenges to eligibility to vote. Even though the election was extremely 
close, this careful and constant supervision foreclosed protests and brought 
a measure of stability to the troubled local.190 
These two cases emphasize the infinitely complex task confronting a court 
in protecting the election process when the situation requires extensive judi- 
cial intervention. The first case demonstrates the near impossibility of draft- 
ing a decree fully disposing of every detail and the destructive consequences 
of leaving a single gap. Meaningful protection of the members' right to elect 
their officers may in some cases require continuing supervision-a burden 
which judges are understandably reluctant to assume. The second case 
demonstrates that the judicial process need not be so inflexible or unimagina- 
tive. Where extensive intervention is required, an administrator or special 
master can be named to relieve the judges of the burden and dispose of dis- 
putes without delay.19' The New York courts have named such an admin- 
istrator or master to conduct a union election only where the parties have so 
stipulated, but there is no serious doubt as to the judicial power to impose such a 
device to aid the court.192 
189. The parties agreed that the election was to be conducted by the American 
Arbitration Association, but it refused. The trustee sought to substitute the Honest Ballot 
Association, but the insurgents objected. The court-appointed referee then named an 
arbitrator, Robert Feinberg, to conduct the election. This was opposed by the trustee, 
but upheld by the court. See Holdeman v. International Org. of Masters, 7 App. Div. 2d 
1021, 184 N.Y.S.2d 698 (1959), aff'd 6 N.Y.2d 869, 188 N.Y.S.2d 987, 160 N.E.2d 119 
(1959). 
190. For other cases in which the parties stipulated that the court should appoint a 
referee to supervise the election, see Jacobs v. Ryan, N.Y. Sup. Ct., Kings Cty., Jan. 1, 
1950; Yellin v. Schaefer, 46 L.R.R.M. 2723 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1960). 
191. The effectiveness of a court-appointed master is forcefully demonstrated in Yellin 
v. Schaefer, supra note 190. The incumbent officers, who ruled the union as their private 
domain, agreed to an election believing that they could control its outcome. When they 
realized that the master was going to closely supervise the details and insure an honest 
election, they attempted to repudiate the agreement. 
192. See, e.g., Boggia v. Hoffa, 47 L.R.R.M. 2593 (E.D.N.Y. 1950), where the court 
appointed the Election Institute to conduct a local election and certify the results. The use 
of a master to perform a particular function in a specific case is to be distinguished from 
the appointment of a receiver with general vistorial powers, or the even more extravagant 
device of the Board of Monitors concocted by the parties in the litigation developing out 
of the election contest in the Teamster's Union. See Comment, Monitors: A New 
Equitable Remedy?, 70 YALE L.J. 103 (1960); Mandelbaum, Teamster Monitorship: A 
Lesson For the Future, 20 FED. B.J. 125 (1960). 
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This is not intended to suggest that courts should freely exercise such 
broad supervisory powers. It only suggests that in some cases extensive 
intervention may be required, and when it is required the courts have ample 
resources to meet the need without the judges becoming overwhelmed by the 
complexity of the task. 
CONCLUSION 
This study has been limited to state court litigation and no attempt has 
been made to relate the decisions here to specific substantive or procedural pro- 
visions of Title IV of the Labor Reform Act. The experience of state courts 
described here, however, has manifold implications in the administration of 
the federal statute. Only some of the most obvious can be suggested here. 
First, the federal statute has expressly adopted the critical standards which 
the courts have only hesitantly followed, and has given those standards 
specific content by including specific rules as illustrative examples. Title 
IV, like the statute itself, has at its core protection of the democratic process, 
and the basic rights to be guaranteed are illustrated by specific provisions 
protecting the right to make nominations, to be a candidate, to support 
candidates and to vote.193 The standard of fair competition is manifest in 
provisions requiring the union to give every candidate equal treatment in the use 
of membership lists and distribution of campaign literature,194 and prohibiting 
the use of union funds to promote the candidancy of any person.195 The standard 
of honesty is expressed in provisions giving candidates the right to have 
observers at the polls 198 and requiring the union to preserve the ballots 
and election records for one year.197 The statute, however, does not pretend 
to prescribe a detailed code. That task is left to the courts which must build 
a body of law by giving added specific content to these statutorily declared 
standards case by case.198 Judges need no longer be hesitant, nor can they 
be half-hearted, for Congress has charged them with the responsibility for 
insuring a "fair election." 
193. Section 401(e), 73 Stat. 533 (1959), 29 U.S.C. ? 481(e) (Supp. 1961). 
194. Section 401(c) 73 Stat. 532 (1959), 29 U.S.C. ? 481(c) (Supp. 1961). 
195. Section 401(g) 73 Stat. 533 (1959), 29 U.S.C. ? 481(g) (Supp. 1961). 
196. Section 401(c) 73 Stat. 532 (1959), 29 U.S.C. ? 481(c) (Supp. 1961). 
197. Section 401(e) 73 Stat. 533 (1959), 29 U.S.C. ? 481(e) (Supp. 1961). The 
statute also bears traces of the standard of public virtue, for ? 504 restricts the 
right of persons who have been members of the Communist Party or convicted of 
certain crimes to hold union office. 73 Stat. 536 (1959), 29 U.S.C. ? 504(a) (Supp. 1961). 
This, however, was narrowly worded as an exceptional restriction on the union's otherwise 
broad freedom to determine the qualifications for office. It is not an invitation for the 
court to substitute its judgment of the relative virtues of the candidates for the free 
choice of the members, and thereby deny both union autonomy and union democracy. 
198. The ambiguous and incomplete words of the union constitution must now be 
interpreted against the background of these standards, and general terms of the statute 
draw meaning from these central values. Most important, the catch-all clause that "adequate 
safeguards to insure a fair election shall be provided," makes these pervasive statutory 
standards applicable to every element of the election process. 
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Second, effective protection of the election process requires scrupulous 
attention to details at every stage from selection of the election committee to 
tabulation of the ballots, for one seemingly small flaw can undermine the 
integrity of the whole process. A "fair election" within the meaning of the 
statute is one in which the basic statutory standards have been observed 
at every stage of the process. The courts and the Secretary of Labor must 
therefore be sensitive to the importance of details and make close inquiry into 
every claimed defect to discover its actual impact on the process. The test 
is not whether the defect can make the difference between victory and 
defeat in the election but whether it violates the statutory standards. 
Third, effective enforcement of the statute must rest on pre-election rem- 
edies. Challenging an election after it has been conducted has proven too slow 
and burdensome to be of much practical value,199 and the availability of such 
a remedy under the federal statute should not cause the courts to withhold 
pre-election protection.200 The state courts have recognized that correcting de- 
fects prior to an election gives the members the fair election to which they are en- 
titled; saves the union the costs and disruption of a second election; and lightens 
the court's responsibility. Congress was aware of these advantages and deliber- 
ately preserved pre-election remedies ;201 the courts ought not be niggardly in 
their use. Only through such remedies can the courts give vital substance to the 
standards of democratic rights, fair competition, and honesty in union elections. 
199. Commissioner Holcombe of the Bureau of Labor Management Reports has 
stated that the election provision is being nullified by maneuvers to defer action in the 
courts until the contested term have expired. Of nine election cases filed in July, 1960, 
only one had been settled and none had come to trial ten months later. 48 L.R.R.M. at 
92-93. 
200. A number of federal district courts have shown a disturbing tendency to make 
enforcement of the statute rest wholly on the procedure for challenging an election after it 
is conducted. See Rarick v. United Steelworkers, 47 L.R.R.M. 2343 (W.D. Pa. 1960). 
This seems to be based on the erroneous assumption that this remedy is the sole remedy 
for enforcing rights under Title IV. See Byrd v. Archer, 45 L.R.R.M. 2289 (S.D. Cal. 
1959); Johnson v. San Diego Waiter Union, 47 L.R.R.M. 2450 (S.D. Cal. 1961). The 
last sentence of ? 403, however, was never intended to do more than limit to a single 
procedure the challenging of an election already conducted. The wording of the sentence 
requires no broader reading, nor will any other reading be consistent with the pre-election 
remedy expressly provided in ? 401 (c). 
A sharply contrasting approach has been followed in the Second Circuit. The dis- 
trict court in a pre-election suit ordered the election held under the supervision of the 
Election Institute. Boggia v. Hoffa, 47 L.R.R.M. 2593 (E.D.N.Y. 1960). This sweeping 
pre-election protection was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals, 47 L.R.R.M. 
2594 (2d Cir. 1960). After the election the court certified the results and confirmed the 
victors in office. 47 L.R.R.M. 2595 (E.D.N.Y. 1961). 
201. The legislative history showing the congressional purpose and intent to pre- 
serve pre-election remedies has been set out in Summers, Pre-emption And The Labor 
Reform Act-Dual Rights and Remedies, 22 OHIO ST. L.J. 119 (1961). 
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